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CODE, CRASH, AND OPEN SOURCE: THE 
OUTSOURCING OF FINANCIAL REGULATION TO RISK 
MODELS AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Erik F. Gerding* 
Abstract: The widespread use of computer-based risk models in the financial industry 
during the last two decades enabled the marketing of more complex financial products to 
consumers, the growth of securitization and derivatives, and the development of 
sophisticated risk-management strategies by financial institutions. Over this same period, 
regulators increasingly delegated or outsourced vast responsibility for regulating risk in both 
consumer finance and financial markets to these privately owned industry models. 
Proprietary risk models of financial institutions thus came to serve as a “new financial code” 
that regulated transfers of risk among consumers, financial institutions, and investors. 
The spectacular failure of financial-industry risk models in the current worldwide 
financial crisis underscores the dangers of regulatory outsourcing to the new financial code. 
This Article explains how financial institutions used the “new financial code” to shift, 
spread, and price financial risk using the template of the stages of securitization of consumer-
credit products, hedging through credit default swaps, and overall portfolio management. 
This Article then examines several explanations for the failures of risk models, which 
contributed to the current crisis, including flaws in the design of risk models and agency 
costs associated with those models. It also outlines several lessons for regulatory outsourcing 
from the current crisis, including the following: 
• Bank regulators should scrap those provisions of Basel II that allow certain 
banks to set their own capital requirements according to their internal risk 
models; 
• Regulators should promote “open source” in code (or the models) used to 
market financial products to consumers, price securitizations and derivatives, 
and manage financial-institution risk; and 
• The failure of risk models used to price securitizations and derivatives reveals 
some of the comparative advantages of equity securities in spreading risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The revolution in quantitative finance that occurred over the last two 
decades produced models that enabled the rapid growth of securitization 
and derivatives.1 This Article demonstrates that financial regulators 
delegated or outsourced to these computer-based risk models the 
responsibility of regulating a wide range of risk transfers in the 
economy—from consumer finance to global financial markets. These 
risk models failed spectacularly in the global financial crisis that started 
in the subprime mortgage market, and this outsourcing of regulation 
exacerbated the crisis. 
                                                     
1. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency 
Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008) (describing how advances in 
quantitative finance have led to the development of sophisticated derivatives and other financial 
products that promise both to lead to “complete” capital markets and drain liquidity from equity 
markets). 
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To understand the crisis, the failure of risk models, and the dangers of 
regulatory outsourcing, it is helpful to sketch out the system by which 
mortgages are connected to asset-backed securities, derivatives, and 
financial risk to global financial institutions.2 Securitization uses the 
future payment streams from mortgages and other credit products to 
create securities that are sold to investors. These investors not only 
acquire the right to these payment streams, but also assume a portion of 
the financial risk that borrowers will not make payment on the 
underlying mortgages when due; securitization thus carves up the risk 
associated with mortgages and other securitized assets into slices, which 
are then spread among investors.3 Those investors could then use credit 
derivatives and other derivatives to offload parts of this risk to 
counterparties in exchange for paying premiums to those counterparties.4  
Securitization and derivatives created a system for transferring risk 
and spreading it among those investors who could theoretically bear risk 
most efficiently.5 Each part of this risk-transfer system was enabled by 
private, computer-based industry risk models that were built using 
innovations in quantitative finance. These models include the following: 
• Data-mining and credit-scoring software used by financial 
institutions to market mortgages, loans and other financial 
products to individual consumers (this marketing includes not 
only setting the price of those products to match the risk of 
individual borrowers, but also creating complex features in 
those products that can be tailored for certain categories of 
consumers);6 
• Pricing models used by financial institutions to structure and 
price the securitization of those consumer financial products;7 
• Models used by credit-rating agencies to assign ratings to the 
asset-backed securities issued in securitizations;8 
                                                     
2. This system is described in detail in Part I.B infra. 
3. The mechanics of securitization are described in greater detail in Part I.B.ii infra. 
4. For an analysis of derivative transactions, see Part I.B.iv infra. 
5. See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 1, at 263. 
6. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: the Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 719–21, 724–26 (2006) (analyzing how advances in financial 
industry data collection technology allow lenders to market highly complex financial products to 
consumers and gain an information advantage over consumers with respect to predicting consumer 
defaults and penalties under those products). Use of code at the level of consumer finance is 
examined further in Part I.B.i. 
7. See infra Part I.B.ii. 
8. See infra Part I.B.iii.1. 
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• Models used to price those derivatives that further hedge the 
risks of asset-backed securities;9 and 
• Models used by financial institutions to manage their 
investment portfolios and set their overall risk-management 
policies.10 
This Article refers to the above-mentioned data-mining software and 
computer-based risk models as the “new financial code.” As the new 
financial code proliferated, regulators outsourced to it significant 
responsibility for regulating financial markets. Regulatory outsourcing 
occurs at each point in the financial system in which computer-based 
risk models are used, including in the following areas: 
• Regulators have permitted lenders to use sophisticated data-
mining and credit-scoring software to tailor and market 
increasingly complex mortgages and other credit products to 
consumers, and particularly to those consumers least able to 
navigate that complexity.11 
• Regulators have outsourced oversight of the risk transfer in 
the securitization of financial products to rating agencies 
indirectly via regulations that govern the principle investors 
who purchase asset-backed securities. Numerous financial 
regulations restrict investments by banks and certain other 
institutional investors to “investment-grade” debt. These 
regulations delegate regulation of the risk-taking by these 
institutions to rating agencies that determine which securities 
qualify as “investment grade.”12 
                                                     
9. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1019, 1020–22, 1029–30 (2007) (analyzing two of these devices—credit default swaps and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)—and emphasizing the importance of mathematical models 
for CDOs). For an earlier article analyzing use of code in constructing derivatives, see Henry T.C. 
Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: the Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory 
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1476–81 (1993). Use of code in hedging, including in pricing 
derivatives, is explored in Part I.B.iii.4 infra. 
10. Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: a Case Study of Capital 
Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 159–62, 178, 183–87 (1997) (detailing 
arguments for superiority of banks’ internal models to measure risk and set capital requirements 
compared to regulatory methods). Use of code for these purposes is discussed in Part I.B.iii.3 infra. 
11. See infra Part I.B.i. 
12. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 681 (1999) (characterizing regulations that limit 
financial institutions to investments that are rated by rating agencies as giving those rating agencies 
a “regulatory license”). 
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• Under the Basel II Accord,13 certain large banks received 
authority from regulators to set their capital requirements 
using the banks’ proprietary risk models.14 The new accord 
also permits banks to set capital requirements using rating 
agency ratings as a critical determinant.15 
• In 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) followed the Basel II model by allowing certain large 
U.S. financial conglomerates to set their required regulatory 
capital according to their own proprietary risk models.16 
• Regulators have resisted calls to regulate complex over-the-
counter (OTC) credit derivatives, which financial institutions 
have used to hedge risks from securitizations and financial 
                                                     
13. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (June 2006) 
[hereinafter “Basel II”], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n13.pdf. 
Basel II is the second accord among bank regulators and central bankers from countries that 
belong to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (members come from the so-called “Group 
of Ten” countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The accord consists of a series of 
recommended bank regulations and principles that national regulators should implement in their 
home countries. The accord thus attempts to set minimum international banking standards to 
mitigate both regulatory arbitrage by international banks and financial risks caused by potential 
bank failure that could spread from one economy to another. For a capsule summary of the Basel 
accords, see Robert Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption of Basel II and the Basel II Securitization 
Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45 (2008); Eric Y. Wu, Basel II: a Revised Framework, 24 
ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 150 (2005). 
Although non-binding, national regulators exert pressure on one another to comply with the 
accord, giving it the quality of “soft law.” See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global 
Administrative Law: the View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006) (reciting critiques of 
law-making by networks of bank regulators and international bureaucrats in the Basel Accord as 
lacking accountability and legitimacy, but arguing that Basel II is subject to a subtle structure of 
international administrative law); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global 
Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE 611 (2005). 
14. Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation: 
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW 43, 46 (2003). 
15. BASEL II, supra note 13, at 19 (permitting banks to set regulatory capital for credit risk in part 
based on rating agency ratings (i.e., “external credit assessment)). See also id. at 27 (establishing the 
requirements that specify when banks can use “external credit assessment” to support capital-
requirement assessments for credit risk). 
The principle U.S. banking regulators have already issued a final rule setting out the framework 
for Basel II implementation in the United States. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital 
Adequacy Framework – Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 559, 560, 563, 567). 
16. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 and 240). 
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risk generally.17 
• In addition, regulators have been reluctant to regulate hedge 
funds, which comprise a significant number of the 
counterparties to OTC derivatives.18 Even preliminary 
attempts at regulating hedge funds19 were thwarted in the face 
of the terrible complexity of these funds and uncertainty as to 
the scope of risk that they posed.20 
By outsourcing, financial regulators placed great faith in the new 
                                                     
17. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 704–07 (1999) (noting that OTC market is largely 
unregulated, but describing debate on regulation in context of proposed Commodity Exchange Act 
amendments). 
Then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed concern about how over-regulation 
of OTC derivatives might impair market efficiency and threaten U.S. competitiveness. Working 
Group Report on OTC Derivatives: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry, 106th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2000) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at http://agriculture.senate.gov/Hearings/ 
Hearings_2000/wl00210/0029gre.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington. 
edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n17.pdf. 
His position meshed with views among other policymakers and scholars that light regulation was 
justified given a “set of private mechanisms that facilitate smooth functioning OTC derivatives 
markets.” GARRY J. SCHINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL STABILITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 206 
(2006) (“Market discipline, provided by shareholders and creditors, promotes market stability by 
rewarding financial institutions based on their performance and creditworthiness.”) But, Mr. 
Schinasi also notes, “Recent research finds market discipline to be strong only during periods of 
banking sector stress and volatile financial markets.” Id. 
18. Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our Financial 
Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 221–26 (2008) (criticizing proposals to regulate hedge funds as too 
modest). But cf. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: the SEC’s Regulatory 
Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 977 (2006) (describing possible rationale 
behind SEC attempt to require registration of hedge funds). The proposed SEC regulation 
(discussed infra note 19) was opposed by Alan Greenspan, who favors leaving hedge funds 
unregulated. DIMITRIS N. CHORAFAS, STRESS TESTING FOR RISK CONTROL UNDER BASEL II 299 
(2006) (describing letter Greenspan sent to Congress opposing SEC regulation); ALAN GREENSPAN, 
THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 370 (2007) (arguing that hedge funds 
are sufficiently regulated by “market surveillance”). 
19. In one notable example, the Securities and Exchange Commission passed regulations 
requiring certain hedge funds to register with the Commission. Registration under the Advisers Act 
of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054-
01 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279 (2005)), invalidated by Goldstein v. SEC, 
451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
20. The SEC’s hedge-fund registration rule prompted a sharp dissent from two SEC 
commissioners who argued that the benefits of registration paled in comparison to the costs the rule 
imposed on hedge funds. Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,089 (dissent of Commissioners 
Glassman and Atkins). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately struck down the 
SEC rule on statutory interpretation grounds. See Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884. 
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technology of financial institutions to police the transfers of risk made 
via complex financial products.21 Regulators were both daunted by the 
complexity posed by new financial instruments and awed by the promise 
of new financial engineering to shift and spread risk efficiently.  
But the financial crisis that began in the subprime mortgage market 
belied this promise, as risk models failed to anticipate a wave of defaults 
on consumer mortgages that led to losses on mortgage-backed securities. 
Massive foreclosures in residential real estate and widespread failures of 
major financial institutions provide stark evidence of the failure of the 
new financial code to regulate risk. 
Before this Article begins to examine the rise and crash of the new 
financial code, it is useful to examine briefly a parallel in an altogether 
different area of legal scholarship to provide context for the problem of 
the new financial code and suggest possible solutions. The way in which 
financial institutions came to regulate a large part of financial markets 
resembles, in several important ways, how proprietary software has 
come to regulate the internet. In 1999, cyberlaw scholar Lawrence 
Lessig described how the private sector created software that establishes 
the “architecture” of the world-wide web, and how this software 
functions as a kind of private regulation.22 According to Lessig, this 
software enables private firms (and ultimately governments) to track and 
regulate the behavior of individuals who use the internet.23 Yet internet 
users little suspect the ways in which computer codes constrain them.24 
                                                     
21. See generally Bhala, supra note 10. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan typified the 
optimism for the new financial code. He lauded the benefits of code for the consumer credit market: 
With these advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and 
other techniques for efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers. . . . 
Where once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit, lenders are now 
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk 
appropriately. These improvements have led to rapid growth in subprime mortgage lending. 
Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Federal Reserve System’s Fourth Annual Community Affairs 
Research Conference (Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Greenspan Apr. 8, 2005 Remarks], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n21a.pdf. 
Two years earlier, Greenspan touted the ability of these same risk models combined with loan 
securitization to increase market efficiency and to open “doors to national credit markets for both 
consumers and businesses.” Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the JumpStart Coalition’s Annual Meeting 
(Apr. 3, 2003), available at https://www.jumpstartcoalition.org/fileuptemp/GreenspanRemarks.htm, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n21b.pdf. 
22. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
23. Id. at 41–53. 
24. Id. at 4–8. The architecture of the internet also facilitates government regulation of the web, 
which threatens to constrain free speech, id. at 164–85, intrude on privacy, id. at 142–63, and 
consolidate industry ownership of intellectual property, id. at 122–41. 
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Because this regulation is embedded within a complex technology, it 
escaped scrutiny by policymakers until examined by Lessig and other 
cyberlaw scholars. For the same reason, the new financial code also long 
escaped detailed scrutiny and criticism. 
One of Lessig’s recommendations for exposing the darker side of the 
regulatory potential for internet code is to promote open source in 
software.25 This Article argues that the same approach should be applied 
to remedy the failures of the new financial code. It argues for greater 
disclosure of the algorithms and internal workings of the codes used to 
market financial products to consumers, price asset-backed securities 
and derivatives, and set risk-management policies at financial 
institutions. This increased transparency will allow these various codes 
to be examined by the marketplace and the wider public, improving the 
ability of codes to regulate transfers of risk. Greater transparency would 
also allow the public to examine consumer-lending practices and to root 
out invasions of privacy and predatory or discriminatory lending. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines both how the rise of 
risk models enabled the growth of securitization in the last two decades 
and how financial regulators increasingly outsourced regulatory 
responsibility to these industry models. Part I then sketches how the 
current financial crisis spread, demonstrating the failure of these models. 
It also draws historical parallels from the failure of risk models in the 
current crisis to both the 1987 stock-market crash and the failure of the 
Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998. Part II examines 
some of the explanations for the spectacular failures of risk models in 
the current financial crisis. Part III investigates several policy 
implications of these failures, and argues that bank regulators should 
abandon those provisions of the Basel II Accord that allow large banks 
to set their own regulatory capital according to their internal risk models. 
It also argues that regulators should promote open source in the 
proprietary models used to market consumer financial products, price 
securitizations, and manage financial institution risk. Lastly, Part III 
responds to a recent article by Professors Gilson and Whitehead noting 
the decline of equity markets at the expense of complex financial 
instruments made possible by complex risk models.26  
                                                     
25. Id. at 100. 
26. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 1. 
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I.  THE RISE OF THE NEW FINANCIAL CODE AND ITS CRASH 
Part I details the rise of financial institution risk models in the last two 
decades and provides a snapshot of how these models failed in the 
ongoing global financial crisis. Part I.A begins with a short summary of 
different forms of financial risk and then explains how developments in 
quantitative finance led to new computer-based models that could 
estimate and price these different forms of risk. 
Part I.B then explains how these computer-based models enabled the 
development of new financial products that broke risk into pieces that 
could be transferred and spread to investors in financial markets. Part I.B 
uses the following chain of securitization and hedging as an 
organizational template: (i) the marketing of mortgages (and other credit 
products) to consumers; (ii) the securitization of these mortgages, 
creating mortgage-backed securities; (iii) the decision by banks and 
other institutions to purchase mortgage-backed securities and other 
asset-backed securities; and (iv) the use of derivatives to hedge risks 
from asset-backed securities. At each link of this chain, Part I.B 
demonstrates both how financial institutions use computer-based models 
to price and manage risk, and how regulators outsourced regulatory 
responsibility to these models for overseeing massive transfers of risk. 
Part I.C provides a brief snapshot of how the financial crisis began 
and how it revealed the failure of industry risk models to anticipate or 
price financial risk. Part I.D then draws parallels between these failures 
of the new financial code and factors that contributed to the 1987 crash 
of the U.S. stock market and the 1998 failure of the Long-Term Capital 
Management hedge fund. 
 
A. A Primer on Financial Risk 
i.  Typology of Risk 
One of the principal uses of the new financial code is to help financial 
institutions manage risk and price financial products given expected risk. 
Therefore, it is important to first lay out a typology of different financial 
risks that the new financial code attempts to model. Financial risk means 
most basically the possibility of losing money due to an event.27 Risk 
                                                     
27. Cf. JOËL BESSIS, RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKING 11–12 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing risks faced 
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models attempt to quantify the probability and extent of a loss.28 
As detailed in Part I.A.ii infra, risk models make various assumptions 
in attempting to quantify these probabilities and often use historic loss 
data to model future losses. But attempts to quantify these probabilities 
are inherently problematic because future losses may not follow historic 
patterns. This highlights an important distinction that economists have 
drawn between “risk” (when the probabilities of future loss are known—
for example, when playing a game of dice) and “uncertainty” (when 
probabilities of future loss are not known).29 The question then becomes 
how well historic data can predict future losses, or, more generally, how 
effectively measurements of “risk” serve as a proxy for quantifying 
“uncertainty.” 
This distinction between risk and uncertainty aside, the architects of 
these models make meaningful predictions by breaking financial risk 
into categories based on the source of potential loss.30 Two of the most 
basic forms of risk that financial institutions attempt to model and 
quantify are credit risk and market risk, which are defined as follows: 
Credit risk: For a financial institution, credit risk is the risk that a 
borrower will default on payment of obligations to that institution.31 
Credit risk includes counterparty risk in derivative transactions, i.e., the 
risk that a counterparty which has contractual obligations to make 
payment to an institution (upon an event specified in the derivative 
contract) will not perform those obligations.32 
Market risk: Market risk, on the other hand, covers risks that the 
value of a firm’s investments or other assets will decline (or that its 
                                                     
by banks and defining risk as “uncertainties resulting in adverse variations of profitability or in 
losses”); NEIL CROCKFORD, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT 5–6 (2d ed. 1986). 
28. BESSIS, supra note 27, at xi. 
29. This key distinction was first made by economist Frank Knight over seventy-five years ago, 
in FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). See Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. 
Yahya, “Left Behind” After Sarbanes Oxley, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1383, 1392 (2007) (noting that 
Knight created this distinction). 
30. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 12. 
31. Id. at 13. Bessis notes that credit risk also covers the decline in the credit standing of an 
obligor, or bonds or stock held by the institution even short of default, as this decline “triggers an 
upward move of the required market yield to compensate [for] the higher risk and triggers a value 
decline” of the security. Id. 
32. Id. at 499–504 (discussing credit risk in the context of derivatives). For an economic analysis 
of the effects of counterparty risk on the pricing of derivatives and other complex financial 
instruments, see generally Robert A. Jarrow & Fan Yu, Counterparty Risk and the Pricing of 
Defaultable Securities, 56 J. FIN. 1765 (2002). 
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liabilities will increase) due to changes in market prices.33 Because a 
firm’s investment portfolio may be subject to price fluctuations in 
different types of markets, market risk includes several different 
subcategories of risk, including: (1) interest rate risk, or the risk 
exposure from changes in interest rates;34 and (2) equity risk, or risk 
arising from fluctuations in stock returns.35 
As detailed in Part I.A.ii infra, quantitative finance has created 
sophisticated means of modeling all of the above forms of risk. Other 
important categories of risk, such as operational, liquidity, and systemic 
risk, prove harder to quantify as they are less directly reflected by 
historical market data. These forms of risk are defined as follows: 
Operational risk: Operational risk is a broad term that conveys risk 
posed by a firm’s operations. The Basel II Accord defines operational 
risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events.”36 Operational 
risk thus covers everything from potential losses caused by employee 
mistake or fraud, to losses from hurricanes. 
Liquidity risk: Liquidity risk also proves difficult to model with 
market data, as it occurs when markets seize up. This risk takes two 
forms. Trading-liquidity risk (also called market liquidity risk) is the risk 
that a firm cannot find a counterparty in the market willing to buy or sell 
the asset at fair market value.37 Funding-liquidity risk means “the risk 
that [a] firm will not be able to meet efficiently both expected and 
unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs without 
affecting either daily operations or the financial condition of the firm.”38 
Systemic risk: Systemic risk arises from a broader market failure; this 
                                                     
33. HENNIE VAN GREUNING & SONJA BRAJOVIC BRATANOVIC, ANALYZING AND MANAGING 
BANKING RISK: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL RISK 111 
(2003). 
34. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 17. 
35. ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION 60 (2002) (discussing measurement of 
equity risk through equity-risk premiums). 
36. BASEL II, supra note 13, at 144, ¶ 644. 
37. This raises the question of what constitutes “fair market value.” There are other variations on 
the definition of “trading-liquidity risk” or “market-liquidity risk” that have their own ambiguities. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, market-liquidity risk occurs when “a firm 
cannot easily offset or eliminate a position at the market price because of inadequate market depth 
or market disruption.” BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND 
LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 1 n.2 (June 2008). 
38. Id. 
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form of risk denotes potential losses that affect the entire market,39 and 
which thus cannot be mitigated through diversification.40 These systemic 
losses may begin with an external shock that disrupts entire financial 
markets, or with a chain reaction in which one financial institution fails, 
causing its creditors to fail as well.41 Systemic risk represents a prime 
concern of financial regulators, due to its enormous repercussions and 
the inability of any individual financial institution to mitigate this form 
of risk through diversification.42 
Other forms of risk: Financial institutions also must manage other 
forms of specialized risk, including concentration risk (potential losses 
to a lender due to a high percentage of its total loans concentrated in a 
small number of debtors),43 and reputation risk (potential losses 
stemming from a decline in public opinion of the institution).44 
Reputation risk also encompasses the potential threat of bank runs, 
which occur when depositors withdraw funds due to an institution’s 
deterioration in creditworthiness, whether actual or perceived (or even 
the perceived deterioration of the financial health of other firms).45 
ii. The Revolution in Quantitative Finance 
The capacity (however limited) of models to measure risk in a 
sophisticated way stems from the revolution in quantitative finance over 
the past two decades. This revolution began with the widespread use of 
                                                     
39. Systemic risk has been defined as “the risk of a breakdown in an entire system, as opposed to 
breakdowns in individual parts or components.” George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is 
Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003); 
see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). 
40. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 142 (2006) 
(discussing how arbitrageurs cannot diversify away systemic risk). 
41. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 39, at 372–73. 
42. See Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 200–02. Professor Schwarcz argues that not only do financial 
institutions lack the capacity to deal with systemic risk individually (because of an inability to 
diversify away the risk), but that they also lack incentives due to collective action failure; no one 
firm can capture all the of the benefit of an action it takes to reduce systemic risk. Id. 
43. FRANK J. FABOZZI, BOND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 491 (2001). 
44. See Konrad S. Alt, Managing Reputation Risk, RMA J., Sept. 2002, at 40–41. 
45. Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities 
Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL 15, 19–20 (Hal S. Scott 
ed., 2005). Even non-banks may experience the modern equivalent of a bank run when other firms 
that have extended credit to them make margin calls. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Vikram Nanda, 
Leverage and Market Stability: The Role of Margin Rules and Price Limits, 71 J. BUS. 179, 182 
(1998) (analyzing the potential destabilizing effects of margin calls). 
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the Black-Scholes model for pricing options.46 This model, when 
combined with incredible increases in computing power, enabled 
specialists in the new field of quantitative finance to build sophisticated 
pricing and risk models. These models could churn volumes of market 
data into nuanced forecasts of expected losses (and returns).47 The 
following paragraphs detail some of the basic risk-modeling tools 
developed during this revolution. 
Value-at Risk: Value-at-risk is a method used to determine potential 
losses from a given form of risk. One option for measuring potential 
losses is to determine the maximum possible loss. This is not a useful 
yardstick, however, because while the maximum loss might be 
enormous (e.g., 100% of the value of an asset), the probability of that 
loss occurring might be negligible. By contrast, value-at-risk provides a 
measure of both the extent and probability of losses occurring.48 Simply 
stated, value-at-risk describes the maximum possible loss over a 
specified time period with a given level of confidence.49 For example, a 
value-at-risk determination of a maximum of $1,000,000 of losses over a 
two-week period with a 95% confidence interval translates into a 5% 
probability that losses will exceed $1,000,000 over those two weeks. But 
value-at-risk numbers say nothing about the magnitude of losses above 
that confidence interval.50 In the above example, there is a 5% chance of 
losses exceeding $1,000,000, but the value-at-risk measurement does not 
specify how large those losses may be. 
Diagram A depicts a value-at-risk calculation for the foregoing 
example. The curve depicts expected losses (or gains) on a portfolio with 
the probability of losses (or gains) on the vertical axis and the magnitude 
of losses (or gains) on the horizontal axis. The shaded area represents 
5% of the area under the curve and is therefore equivalent to 5% of 
potential losses. Point x, or $1,000,000, then represents the maximum 
possible loss with a 95% confidence interval (i.e., there is only a 5% 
(100% minus 95%) chance that losses will exceed that amount). 
 
 
 
                                                     
46. DONALD R. VAN DEVENTER ET AL., ADVANCED FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 9 (2005). 
47. Id. at 8–10. 
48. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 12. 
49. Id. 
50. See id. 
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Diagram A 
 
To calculate value-at-risk, modelers must assume the basic 
distribution of losses, i.e., they must determine the shape of the curve in 
the preceding diagram. They have three options. First, they can assume 
that losses fall in a “normal” distribution—in other words, that they 
follow a bell-curve shape. This assumption may have no basis in reality. 
Therefore, modelers can take a second approach of using historical data 
to determine the distribution of losses. This approach has downsides as 
well; historical data chosen may suffer from sample bias. For example, 
modelers may not have looked far enough back in time to gather data, 
and may miss important historical events in which massive losses were 
incurred. Inputting more historical data would ameliorate this, but 
financial markets do not always follow historical patterns.51 
In order to form loss distributions, modelers can also employ a third 
technique—Monte Carlo simulations—which estimates financial losses 
using sophisticated random sampling driven by advanced computing 
power. This random sampling proves particularly valuable when several 
different variables can interact to produce financial loss, i.e., if the 
                                                     
51. Darrel Duffie & Jun Pan, An Overview of Value at Risk, 4 J. DERIVATIVES 7, 19–20 (1997). 
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equation used to calculate losses has multiple variables. But even this 
sophisticated technique requires that modelers make assumptions about 
the relationship among these different variables in real-world markets—
they must write the equation that transforms the several variables into 
financial loss. Modelers can assume that this relationship will follow 
historical patterns (use historical data), which leads back to the problem 
of whether the historical data selected provide an adequate sample. 
Modelers could also develop their own algorithm or equations for the 
relationship, but this in turn leads to the issue of the accuracy of the 
assumptions behind the algorithm.52 
In other words, assumptions in modeling are inescapable, and the 
strength of a model depends on how well the assumptions match the 
future behavior of markets. Even the technological wizardry of Monte 
Carlo simulations cannot transmute uncertainty into risk. 
One particular problem faced by value-at-risk models is “fat tails,” or 
potential large-magnitude, low-probability losses. This phenomenon is 
so named because the ends of a loss distribution curve, where 
probabilities are low, have a higher, or “fatter,” magnitude of loss. 
Diagram B provides a contrast between a normal-shaped distribution of 
losses (line x) and a distribution of losses with a fat-tail (line y). The 
left-hand edge of line y represents low-probability but high-loss events, 
which are often compared to “hundred year storms.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
52. BESSIS, supra note 27, at 608–21. 
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Diagram B 
 
Modelers have several options for dealing with potential fat tails. 
They can “stress test” the models. Stress testing involves changing 
model assumptions, such as confidence level or the period of time 
measured, to see if value-at-risk determinations change.53 Stress tests 
often involve generating worst-case scenarios. Modelers can also judge 
model performance through “back testing.” This involves modelers 
making several hypothetical jumps back in time, inputting historical data 
that were available at those respective times, and then comparing the 
predictions of the model with how losses actually unfolded.54 
B. Code Along the Nodes of the Financial Web: The Stages of 
Securitization 
These and other risk-modeling tools developed during the revolution 
in quantitative finance, when combined with the increases in computing 
power, enabled financial institutions to develop complex new financial 
products, including the mortgage-backed securities that lie at the heart of 
                                                     
53. Id. at 411–12. Extreme Value Theory represents one mathematically sophisticated version of 
stress testing for fat tails, but this tool still relies on assumptions to model uncertainty in terms of 
risk. Id. at 78, 411. 
54. Id. at 411. 
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the recent subprime crisis. The sections below track the rise of code 
using the template of mortgage origination, followed by securitization, 
followed by hedging and risk management in the wake of securitization. 
i. Marketing Financial Products to Consumers 
The securitization process begins with “origination,” when a lender 
extends credit to consumers or other borrowers. This credit can come in 
the form of different kinds of loans or financial products, including 
mortgages, credit cards, and student loans. For any of these products, the 
consumer obligation to repay debt creates a prospective cash stream. 
Originators can then sell the rights to these cash streams. Rights to cash 
streams from different financial products can then be bundled together 
and resold in the later stages of a securitization described below.55 
The use of risk models (or “code”) begins in earnest at this first stage 
of securitization. Originators employ the combination of advanced 
marketing software, data mining, and increasingly detailed credit reports 
to gather information on the creditworthiness of borrowers.56 This 
information is used both to determine whether to approve or deny a loan 
and to set interest rates to match credit risk.57 Many originators use risk 
modeling and other software more aggressively in actively marketing 
financial products to consumers. This marketing can include creating 
complex provisions in a contract that are tailored to different types of 
consumers.58 
Consumer-law scholars such as Lauren Willis,59 Oren Bar-Gill, and 
                                                     
55. For a primer on securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 
1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994). 
56. Willis, supra note 6. 
57. Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 123, 126–27 (2007) (comparing “average-cost pricing,” in which lenders set interest rates for 
the average credit risk of borrowers but may reject loan applicants that pose a higher credit risk with 
“risk-based pricing,” in which lenders tailor interest rates to the credit risk of individual borrowers). 
Professor McCoy notes, however, that interest rates that are ostensibly set to match credit risk may 
also reflect inefficient and socially undesirable motives of lenders, such as rent-seeking and 
discrimination. Id. at 127. 
58. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46–52 (2008) 
(describing data collection by lenders on consumer borrowing behavior); Elizabeth Warren, The 
Middle Class on the Brink of Disaster 7–8 (Apr. 17, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) (describing interdisciplinary empirical and experimental work by financial industry into 
consumer borrower behavior). 
59. See Willis, supra note 6, at 728–29, 737, 768, 829. 
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Elizabeth Warren60 have worried that this data mining gives lenders an 
information advantage over consumer borrowers, which lenders use to 
market financial products that may be potentially exploitative or 
otherwise unsuitable for consumers. (These concerns about consumer-
wealth losses dovetail with the privacy concerns expressed by Lessig on 
the use of code in the internet to track personal data for commercial 
purposes.61) These scholars have argued that the information-gathering 
ability of financial institutions has reversed the traditional information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Lenders now have 
information about a consumer’s ability to repay and likelihood of default 
that the consumer herself does not have.62 These scholars have also 
demonstrated that many originators exploit this information asymmetry 
to offer complex financial products beyond the understanding of many 
consumers who buy them.63 The financial institutions can predict when 
consumers will incur penalties and make higher total payments over the 
life of a loan when complex features are added. Originators then 
incorporate select features to extract maximum revenue from less-
informed consumers.64 
This practice became particularly evident in the mortgage market over 
the last decade. Mortgage lenders began offering home buyers 
mortgages with novel features. These features allowed prospective 
buyers to purchase homes that would otherwise lie beyond their means. 
Most notably, adjustable rate mortgages (or ARMs) offered buyers low 
fixed rates on an introductory or “teaser” basis, with interest rates 
converting to a floating, market-based interest rate after a few years.65 
ARMs and other “exotic” mortgages would cost borrowers substantially 
more over the life of the mortgages than fixed-rate mortgages, but 
allowed borrowers to take out mortgages in amounts for which they 
would not otherwise qualify.66 Low-income borrowers could thus afford 
                                                     
60. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58, at 23–25. 
61. LESSIG, supra note 22, at 151–56. 
62. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58, at 12–14; Warren, supra note 58, at 7–13. 
63. Lauren A. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008) 
(describing how the revolution in data collection, storage, and processing enable the financial-
services industry to model consumer behavior and to market complex products to consumers that 
exceed consumer understanding). 
64. Id. See also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 58, at 23–25; Warren, supra note 58, at 13–22. 
65. McCoy, supra note 57, at 143–44. 
66. The costs to consumers of ARM loans were recognized in legal scholarship over two decades 
ago. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: the Need for Mortgage 
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan 
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their first home. But these mortgages were not marketed exclusively at 
the low-income market; the “subprime” crisis may be a misnomer, as 
middle-class borrowers used ARMs and other exotic mortgages to 
purchase houses too.67 
The risk that these borrowers assumed, often without fully 
understanding it, was that interest rates would significantly rise after the 
teaser period and push their monthly mortgage expense beyond their 
budget. (As Part I.C explains, this problem is exactly what befell many 
borrowers with ARM mortgages.) In other words, ARM mortgages 
transferred interest-rate risk to borrowers. 
As that code enabled mortgage and other lenders to reverse the 
information asymmetry and shift risk to consumers, regulators took little 
action. Consumer-law scholars have faulted regulators for doing little in 
the last decade to protect consumers from complex mortgages (or other 
financial products that consumers poorly understood), despite evidence 
that consumers were taking on high levels of debt and were assuming 
massive interest-rate risk.68 
The reasons for this regulatory inaction are manifold.69 One reason 
regulators may have become comfortable with the higher levels of risk 
assumed by consumers is that the lenders also bore a large measure of 
that risk; if consumers defaulted under their mortgages or other loans, 
lenders took a loss on whatever they could not recover.70 Both lenders 
and financial markets, many regulators assumed, accurately priced and 
                                                     
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (1984). 
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not 
Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1793 (2004) (citing lender data that subprime mortgage 
market included middle-class black and Hispanic families). 
68. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 60, at 70–74. 
69. One explanation for regulatory inaction is that the extension of credit with novel features 
allowed lower-income consumers to buy their first homes and fueled the economy. Cf. Kristopher 
Gerardi et al., Do Households Benefit from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the 
Mortgage Market 35 (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper No. W12967, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=971601, (concluding that deregulation and 
mortgage innovation made the U.S. housing finance market “less imperfect”). Regulators may have 
been wary of upsetting either political support for wider home ownership or the financial industry. 
They also may have been reluctant to disrupt the economic growth stimulated by increased home 
sales. 
70. Cf. THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON 
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (Mar. 2008), reprinted in 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 447, 456 
(Spr. 2008) [hereinafter President’s Working Group] (noting that many originators who sold 
mortgages for securitization still retained some risk of loss if they purchased or guaranteed the 
resultant asset-backed securities). 
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managed this risk due to the advances in the risk models they 
employed.71 
ii. The Pooling and Pricing of Securitizations 
Many originators did not fully bear this risk, however, because they 
sold a large portion of mortgages (or other financial products) to special 
investment vehicles via securitization.72 Therefore, the assumption that 
markets optimally managed risk depends on whether the asset-backed 
securities issued in those securitizations were accurately priced.73 The 
accuracy of the pricing of a securitization, in turn, depends on the quality 
of the code used to model the relevant risks. 
Analyzing the role of models in pricing a securitization requires an 
understanding of the basic structure of securitization and how it transfers 
credit risk. The following paragraphs describe the process of securitizing 
mortgages, which lies at the heart of the subprime crisis (but this 
description could also apply to the securitization of other forms of 
consumer debt, such as credit card debt and student loans). 
In a mortgage securitization, after mortgage lenders originate 
mortgage loans (Stage 1 in Diagram C below), special investment 
vehicles (SIVs) buy pools of mortgages using cash paid by investors 
who bought securities from those vehicles. (These transactions appear in 
Stages 2 and 3 in Diagram C below, and occur practically 
simultaneously.) The securities then pay out to investors based on the 
cash streams the SIVs receive from the underlying mortgages.74 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
71. See Greenspan Apr. 8, 2005 Remarks, supra note 21. 
72. Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown, Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy 
Forum, New York, NY (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/mishkin20080229a.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n72.pdf (discussing incentive problems created by “originate-to-distribute” 
model). 
73. It also depends on whether purchasers of asset-backed securities and their market 
counterparties accurately hedged the risks of those securities. See infra Part I.B.iv. 
74. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376–77 (2008). The underlying mortgages serve as collateral for 
the securities, and, in the event of a liquidation of the SIV, would be sold to satisfy the claims of the 
security holders. 
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Diagram C 
 
By purchasing these asset-backed securities, investors can invest in 
the lucrative consumer-credit market (including investing in mortgages, 
credit card debt, and student loans) while enjoying several benefits that 
are unavailable when extending credit directly to consumers. First, the 
purchasers of securities need not collect payments directly from 
consumers.75 Second, these securities are theoretically more liquid than 
the underlying mortgages.76 Third, asset-backed securities allow 
investors to diversify. This diversification occurs in three different ways. 
First, the pooling of mortgages means that the risk of default on any 
one mortgage is offset by the fact that other mortgages in the pool will 
continue to pay out. This risk-spreading through pooling is a central 
benefit of all securitizations. But this assumes that losses among 
mortgages in the pool will not be highly correlated and that any 
correlation can be accurately estimated and will remain roughly 
                                                     
75. Collection of monies and enforcement of remedies against consumers would usually be the 
role of a “servicer,” a firm employed by the SIV to conduct these administrative tasks. Anand K. 
Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi, Expanding Frontiers of Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES 1, 9 (Anand K. Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 1996). 
76. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: a New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 1, 5, 13 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1997). 
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constant.77 (These assumptions on correlation have been called into 
question by the current global financial crisis as noted in Part II.A.iii). 
Second, securitization facilitates diversification because investors in 
asset-backed securities are only buying a sliver of the mortgage pool’s 
risk, and they can diversify away this risk through other investments in 
their portfolios.78 This assumes, however, that losses on the mortgage-
backed securities that investors purchase are not highly correlated with 
losses on other assets (including other asset-backed securities) in their 
portfolios. 
Third, investors can achieve diversification through the terms of the 
securities being issued. Cash payments on the underlying assets need not 
simply flow to holders of securities pro rata. Instead, the securities can 
be “structured” to create different classes, or “tranches,” of securities, 
with each class having a different level of risk and a different level of 
reward. To accomplish this, the indenture or other agreement 
establishing the terms of each tranche often employs a complex 
“waterfall” rule for payment to different tranches. The waterfall sets the 
order in which the classes are entitled to receive payments from the 
underlying assets; in a simple waterfall, holders of senior classes receive 
amounts due to them in full before holders of junior classes receive 
anything. Thus, junior classes face a higher risk of not being paid due to 
defaults on the underlying assets and receive compensation for this risk 
with a higher interest rate. Different tranches (with different tradeoffs 
between risk and reward) appeal to different types of investors. More 
complex waterfall rules than the example above allow securitizations to 
carve up risk and reward in very finely tuned ways.79 
Yet even in the most basic securitization, the success of this slicing, 
dicing, and pricing of risk and reward depends on the capability of those 
structuring the securitization and those purchasing the securities to 
accurately model the risks involved. Code—in the form of complex 
pricing and risk models—again played an integral role. This code might 
be employed by different financial institutions involved in creating the 
structure for a securitization, including the following: originators, 
                                                     
77. Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance 8 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working 
Paper No. 09-060, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287363, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n77.pdf. 
78. See Kendall, supra note 76, at 13–15. 
79. For an explanation of waterfalls and tranching, see Steven P. Baum, The Securitization of 
Commercial Property Debt, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION, supra note 76, at 45, 49 (describing 
commercial mortgage-backed securities). 
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government-sponsored entities that pool and issue mortgage-backed 
securities (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), and investment banks acting 
as underwriters for the securities.80 
All relied on sophisticated modeling to assess risk and price the 
securities and their institutional services accordingly.81 (Of course rating 
agencies and their models played an outsized role in structuring 
securities as well, which is analyzed in Part I.B.iii.1) Any models for 
pricing asset-backed securities need to analyze credit risk and, in order 
to do so, must answer two questions. First, the models need to assess the 
risk of non-payment (i.e., credit risk) on the underlying assets.82 To 
accomplish this, these models require critical information from the 
originators on the underlying assets. Given the sheer number and variety 
of the underlying assets, originators need to provide certain categories of 
information. For mortgages, these categories might include information 
on geographic location of the homes, sizes of the mortgage loans, loan-
to-value ratios of mortgages, interest rates and other significant terms of 
the mortgages, and delinquencies on the mortgages.83 When modeling 
the risk of mortgage-backed securities, an analysis of this information on 
underlying mortgages in the aggregate (on a pool-wide basis) can miss 
importance nuances that are apparent when looking at data on the level 
of individual mortgages.84 
Second, the models need to assess how risk on the underlying assets 
would course through the waterfall structure of the securitization and 
translate into risk on the various tranches of securities.85 
Certain securitizations might package the securities being issued with 
some form of credit support, either guarantees from a government-
sponsored entity in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities, 
or a bond insurance policy issued by a bond insurer. Conceptually, 
                                                     
80. For a discussion of the roles of these various players in securitizations, see Kendall, supra 
note 76, at 4–14. 
81. For a comprehensive analysis of the modeling that sponsors use for structuring 
securitizations, see generally ANDREW S. DAVIDSON ET AL., SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND 
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (2003). 
82. Id. at 68, 340–42. 
83. Id. at 307 (discussing types of aggregate data on mortgages that will effect credit risk for 
mortgage-backed securities). Cf. KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES §§ 4:92–4:104 (describing disclosures on mortgage characteristics that would impact 
credit risk with respect to mortgage-backed securities), available on Westlaw at “Mortsec.” 
84. Cf. Davidson, supra note 81, at 314 (discussing how loan-level data can better predict 
prepayment risk than pool-level data).  
85. Id. at 38. 
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guarantees and bond insurance serve the same function: the guarantor or 
bond insurer would promise to make certain payments to investors on 
the securities if the SIV failed to do so, and in exchange, the guarantor or 
insurer would receive a premium. Of course, to adequately price their 
premium, the guarantor or insurer would need to apply a risk model to 
assess the risk of non-payment by the SIV.86 
In the United States, there is little direct regulation of the supply side 
of securitization—for example, regulations governing the structure of 
securitizations or specifying which models the sponsors of 
securitizations must use. For the supply side of securitization, there is 
not so much active outsourcing of regulation as an absence of regulation. 
The SEC does regulate disclosure to investors of asset-backed securities. 
But the SEC’s Regulation AB, promulgated in 2005, focused principally 
on SEC registered securitizations and generally did not address the 
majority of asset-backed securities that are privately placed.87 Instead, 
regulation of securitization occurs indirectly, through banking and other 
regulations that restrict the investments that banks and other institutions 
may make. This demand-side regulation, outlined in the next subsection, 
outsources significant responsibility for overseeing the risk transfers of 
securitization to rating agencies. 
iii.  Purchasers of Asset-Backed Securities: Rating Agencies, Regulated 
Financial Institutions, Risk Management, and Basel II 
Thus far, this Article has considered the use of code by those who put 
together securitizations. But code also plays an integral role in the 
decisions by investors to purchase these securities, even when investors 
do not use their own proprietary computer models to price securities. 
1. Rating Agencies 
Instead, investors in asset-backed securities rely heavily on rating 
agency analysis. Moreover, regulators outsourced to rating agencies a 
large measure of oversight over the risk that these investors take on.88 In 
                                                     
86. Kendall, supra note 76, at 4 (describing insurers’ methods for determining excess collateral or 
guaranty policy, including relying on body of historical data). 
87. Asset-backed Securities, Securities Act Release 33-8518, Exchange Act Release 34-50905, 70 
Fed. Reg. 1506-01 (Jan. 7, 2005) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). 
88. Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: the Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1674–76 (describing rating agencies as “de facto 
lawmakers”). 
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many securitizations, rating agencies are paid by the SIV to issue credit 
ratings of the asset-backed securities. Rating agencies, for example 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, then apply their own proprietary 
risk models to analyze the securitization.89 Like those entities that 
sponsor securitizations, rating agencies rely on the originators to provide 
information on the underlying assets. Indeed, rating agencies admit to 
conducting little independent investigation of securitization beyond the 
information provided to them by either the originators or the firms 
sponsoring a securitization.90 Some rating agencies have even admitted 
to conducting little analysis of underlying assets.91 
Rating agencies have a poor track record of predicting credit 
problems; major ratings downgrades on asset-backed securities and 
corporate debt have come only after the market has already learned that 
issuers had serious credit problems.92 Several explanations have been 
offered for this failure, including conflicts of interest created by rating 
agencies receiving compensation from the companies they rate, and the 
rating agencies having no monetary liability for poor performance.93 
Some scholars, notably Frank Partnoy, have persuasively argued that 
                                                     
89. Professors Partnoy and Skeel describe rating agency models as the driving force behind the 
structuring of securitizations. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 664–68; see also Partnoy & Skeel, supra 
note 9, at 1029 (analyzing a type of securitization called collateralized debt obligations). 
This may represent a slight overstatement of the role of rating agencies. Some securitizations—
for example, certain mortgage-backed securities issuances guaranteed by Freddie Mac or Fannie 
Mae—are not rated. Kendall, supra note 76, at 4. Moreover, concerns have been repeatedly raised 
that rating agencies adjust their ratings and models to fit the demands of securitization sponsors 
because of inherent conflicts of interest. See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 31–32 (July 2008) [hereinafter “July 2008 SEC Rating Agency Report”], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n89.pdf. Sponsors of 
securitizations remain the primary architects of the structure of securitizations. Id. at 31. 
 Even so, structurers and sponsors must anticipate the analysis and concerns of the rating agencies 
given the fact that ratings are indispensable to attracting certain investors, as described in Part 
I.B.iii.1 infra. 
90. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 653. 
91. In an oft-repeated quote, Yuri Yoshizawa, the head of Moody’s derivative group explained 
the focus of his group’s analysis of collateralized debt obligations: “We’re structure experts. . . . 
We’re not underlying-asset experts.” Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
Apr. 27, 2008, at 36. 
92. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 621, 642, 661. 
93. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in 
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 68–71, 83–89 (Yasuuki Fuchita & 
Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). 
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regulation is part of the problem.94 Instead of creating incentives for 
better monitoring, regulators have undermined those incentives by 
granting rating agencies a kind of oligopoly power.95 This power stems 
from the fact that the securitization market, including the market for 
mortgage-backed securities, focuses largely on institutional investors.96 
Many of these institutional investors are restricted by regulation to 
purchasing only securities with an investment-grade credit rating.97 
Regulations restrict much of the securities investments of many pension 
funds,98 and regulated financial institutions, including banks99 and 
insurance companies,100 to investment-grade debt. (These restrictions are 
designed to ensure the safety of an entity’s assets, and, in the case of a 
bank or other regulated financial institution, to mitigate systemic risk.101) 
The regulations then provide that only rating agencies that have a special 
license from the SEC as “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations” (NRSROs) can give an investment-grade rating.102 The 
handful of NRSROs, and the models they use to rate securities, thus 
possess great responsibility for regulating the riskiness of investments 
made by a large number of financial institutions. 
2. Risk Management 
Purchasers of asset-backed securities not only rely on the code of 
                                                     
94. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 12, at 681. 
95. See id. at 698. 
96. Kendall, supra note 76, at 15. 
97. James Hedges, Hedge Fund Transparency, in HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES: STRATEGIES, RISK 
ASSESSMENT, AND RETURNS 315, 316 (Greg N. Gregoriou et al. eds., 2003) (discussing regulations 
that discourage mutual funds from investing in debt below investment grade). 
98. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LOANS: 
SECURITIZATION FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS 41 n.41 (Oct. 2003). 
99. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d)(4)(A) (2009) (provision of Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
permitting insured savings banks to invest in investment-grade debt, i.e., debt securities “rated in 
one of the 4 highest rating categories by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization”). 
100. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 700–01 (1999) (outlining use by state regulators of rating 
agencies’ ratings in insurance regulations). 
101. Cf. Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation 
(Jan. 9, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (analyzing whether prudential bank regulations, including 
limitations on investments, mitigates systemic risk), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=236401, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n101.pdf. 
102. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 623. 
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rating agencies to make decisions to purchase individual securities; they 
also rely on a mix of ratings and their own internal models to manage the 
risk of their overall portfolio. Many large companies, particularly 
financial institutions, employ sophisticated proprietary computer-based 
models to manage the credit and market risk of their investment 
portfolios.103 Some financial institutions also sell risk-management 
software and services to smaller companies.104 These models often 
employ many of the devices described above in Part I.A.ii, particularly 
tools to calculate value-at-risk.105 
Securities law requires only indirect and summary disclosure of the 
workings of these internal risk models. Federal securities law requires 
that publicly registered corporations disclose summaries of quantitative 
data about their market-risk exposure,106 and publicly registered 
financial institutions must make additional disclosure.107 Of course, 
numerous SEC and accounting rules govern financial statement 
disclosure of assets and liabilities, and thus give investors information to 
assess an issuer’s credit risk.108 But disclosure requirements stop short of 
substantive review. Moreover, these regulations do not require in-depth 
disclosure of the details of a company’s risk modeling. Even the SEC 
rule on quantitative disclosure of market risk—one of the more explicit 
regulations—requires simply “a description of the model, assumptions, 
and parameters, which are necessary to understand” the numeric 
disclosures.109 
3. Basel II 
Whereas federal laws on securities disclosure have taken a light 
                                                     
103. GREG N. GREGORIOU, FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS 367–69 (2006) (discussing computer-based 
models used by hedge funds to make investment decisions). 
104. See FRANCESCO SAITA, VALUE AT RISK AND BANK CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 96–97 (2007) 
(describing portfolio risk-modeling programs developed by Credit Suisse, J.P. Morgan and others). 
105. Id. at 97 (describing J.P. Morgan product features). 
106. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (2008) (quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk). 
Accounting standards also require disclosure about a firm’s market risk. See, e.g., Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, Original Pronouncements – Accounting Standards as of June 1, 2008, 
Vol. II, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 “Accounting For Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities” (FAS 133) Paragraph 44 (requiring disclosure in financial 
statements on market risk for entities with derivative instruments). 
107. SEC-registered bank holding companies must also disclose the information required by 
Guide 3—“Statistical Disclosure by Bank Holding Companies.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 801(c), 231 (2008). 
108. See, e.g., FAS supra note 106, at ¶ 44.  
109. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.305 (a)(1)(ii)(B), (a)(1)(iii)(C). 
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approach to regulating risk models, federal banking regulations in the 
wake of Basel II actively outsource regulatory responsibility for risk 
management to these models. 
This marks a historic shift, as, until recently, banking and insurance 
laws had never deferred to the internal risk-management models of 
financial institutions, but instead set capital requirements according to 
statutory or regulatory formulae.110 One type of U.S. capital requirement, 
risk-based capital standards, influenced the creation of international risk-
based capital requirements in the international Basel Accord of 1988 
(now known as “Basel I”).111 Under Basel I, bank regulators (including 
in the United States) set capital requirements to address credit risk 
according to a fairly mechanical set of formulae that required financial 
institutions to maintain capital according to the predetermined level of 
risk associated with different classes of assets on a bank’s balance sheet. 
Regulations placed assets in different categories and assigned each 
category a different “risk weight.”112 
Today, Basel II dramatically alters the scale of outsourcing of setting 
standards for regulatory capital for banks to private-industry risk models 
in two ways. First, it increases outsourcing of setting capital standards to 
ratings agencies (and, by implication, their models).113 Second, it also 
outsources the ability to set capital requirements to the internal risk 
models of banks for the first time; Basel II now permits certain large 
banks to use internal models to set their own regulatory capital 
requirements.114 These two trends are reflected in a series of two-part 
rules that Basel II establishes with respect to how national regulators 
may set bank capital requirements. In the first part of each rule, 
                                                     
110. Federal bank regulators are required to set minimum capital requirements under 12 U.S.C.   
§ 1831o(c)(1)m (2008) and 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (2008). 
111. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988, updated to April 1998) [hereinafter 
“Basel I”], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n111.pdf. For historical 
background on adoption of this accord, see Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: a 
Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1299, 1336–42 (1989). See also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 
281–82 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing history of U.S. risk-based capital standards leading to Basel I). 
112. See BASEL I, supra note 111, at Part II. Professor Partnoy notes that, historically, numerous 
U.S. banking regulations have also keyed off of rating agency ratings. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 
687–89, 691 n.349. 
113. See supra notes 13 and 15 and accompanying text. 
114. Norton, supra note 14, at 53–58. 
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regulators apply a standardized set of capital requirements for most 
banks (and these standardized capital requirements rely heavily on rating 
agency determinations). In the second part of each rule, regulators may 
allow select banks to use their internal risk-models to set capital 
requirements. Basel II uses this two-part, bifurcated rule on capital 
requirements to cover credit risk; Basel II supplements a standardized set 
of rules that rely on rating agencies with a new “Internal Ratings-Based 
Approach” that allows certain banks to use internal models to set their 
capital requirements.115 It then uses a similar bifurcated set of rules—a 
standard approach and an internal-models exception for certain banks—
in its separate capital requirements that cover market risk116 and 
                                                     
115. Under the new accord, national bank regulators may apply one of three approaches to setting 
requirements for the level of regulatory capital that banks must hold to offset credit risk. Each of the 
following approaches allows regulators to permit banks to use private-sector risk models to make 
credit risk calculations, which determine the amount of capital required to cover that risk: 
1.   Credit-Risk Standardized Approach: National bank regulators may continue to apply a 
modified version of Basel I, with its categorical approach to setting capital requirements for 
credit risk. This “Standardized Approach” categorizes classes of bank assets into “buckets” 
according to a rough estimate of the credit risk posed by that class. Regulators then assign a 
fixed risk weight for all assets in a particular bucket. Banks must then maintain a level of 
capital for each of its assets equal to the value of that asset multiplied by the asset’s risk 
weight. Basel II, supra note 13, at 19–26. The Basel II Standardized Approach keys the risk 
weights that apply to many of the buckets to rating agency ratings. Id. Furthermore, banks 
may use certain “external credit assessments”—i.e., rating agency ratings—to lower the 
risk weights (and thus the capital requirements) for certain classes of assets even further 
below the amount the Accord specifies for a particular bucket. Id. at 27–28. 
2.   Credit-Risk Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach: Basel II also gives national 
bank regulators the option to allow a bank to determine credit risk capital requirements 
using the bank’s internal credit risk modeling, what the accord labels the “Internal Ratings-
Based Approach.” Id. at 52. The Internal Ratings-Based Approach has two versions. The 
“Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach” gives banks less flexibility in calculating 
their risk exposure. In calculating expected losses from borrower default on a given asset, 
banks can use their own internal models to calculate the probability of default. But, to 
calculate the magnitude of loss given a borrower default on an asset, banks must use a 
categorical, risk-weighted number assigned to all assets of the same class. This mirrors the 
bucket system of the Standardized Approach. Id. at 59–60. 
3.   Credit-Risk Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach: The “Advanced Internal Ratings-
Based Approach,” by contrast, allows banks to use internal models to calculate both 
probability and magnitude of losses from credit risk for purposes of setting risk weights for 
assets. Id. 
116. Basel II also take a bifurcated approach to the standard for regulatory capital that banks must 
hold to offset market risk, establishing both the following standardized and internal model 
approaches: 
1.   Market-Risk Standardized Measurement Method: Basel II’s standardized method for 
market risk specifies a complex mix of bucket risk weights and value-at-risk methodology 
to set capital requirements covering market-risk exposure. National bank regulators must 
then ensure that banks follow this standard in determining credit-risk exposure, which then 
determines capital requirements. For sovereign debt and similar assets, the standardized 
method again piggybacks on rating agency ratings. Id. at 166–90. 
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operational risk, respectively.117 
By giving banks the flexibility to adjust their regulatory capital 
according to a mix of rating agency ratings and the respective banks’ 
internal models, Basel II outsources significant regulatory authority to 
the models of rating agencies and banks. To be sure, the Accord sets 
standards for when national regulators may allow banks to use internal 
models, and requires regulators to audit those models.118 But these 
lengthy standards give bank regulators significant discretion in both 
deciding which banks qualify for the privilege to use internal models and 
in determining when and how to audit the models of those banks. 
In December 2007, the principal federal bank regulators—the Federal 
Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), FDIC, 
and Office of Thrift Supervision—passed a final rule implementing 
much of the Basel II Accord.119 Even though Basel II is still being 
implemented, several studies have indicated that the provisions of Basel 
II that give banks the ability to set their capital requirements according 
to internal models would lead to substantial declines in regulatory capital 
and undercapitalization for credit risk.120 
                                                     
2.   Market-Risk Internal Models Approach: As with credit risk, Basel II allows national bank 
regulators to permit qualified banks to use their own internal risk models to determine 
market-risk exposure. Basel II favors a value-at-risk approach, and sets standards for these 
internal risk models, but this “Internal Models Approach” gives banks much more 
flexibility in using their own methodologies than the standardized approach listed above. 
Id. at 191–203. 
117. Unlike Basel I, the Basel II Accord requires banks to set aside capital for operational risk. 
But again, the newer accord takes a bifurcated approach: 
1.   Operational-Risk Basic-Indicator Approach & Standardized Approach: These two 
approaches require banks to set aside regulatory capital to cover operational-risk exposure 
based on a fixed percentage of a bank’s income in previous years. The principal difference 
between these two approaches—the Basic-Indicator Approach & the Standardized 
Approach—is that the Standardized Approach is slightly more nuanced. It disaggregates a 
bank’s income according to different lines of business and sets distinct capital requirement 
weights for each of those lines. Id. at 144–46. 
2.   Advanced Measurement Approach: This approach gives national regulators the flexibility 
to allow banks under their jurisdiction to use their internal models based on empirical data 
of the banks’ past operational losses to set operational capital. Id. at 147. 
118. See, e.g., Basel II, supra note 13, at Part 3, Section III (specifying supervisory review 
process that regulators must undertake to review bank compliance). 
119. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework – Basel II, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 559, 560, 563, 567). 
120. After conducting a “Quantitative Impact Study” of the prospective effects of the Internal 
Ratings-Based Approach, U.S. bank regulators expressed concern that this new rule would 
dramatically lower regulatory capital. See, e.g., Pamela Martin, QIS 4: What Do the Numbers Really 
Mean?, RMA J., Sept. 1, 2005; see also Paul H. Kupiec, Basel II: A Case for Recalibration (FDIC 
Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2006-13, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942301, permanent copy available at 
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4. The SEC, Basel II, and Consolidated Supervised Entities 
The Basel II Accord explicitly addresses only the regulation of banks 
and not other financial institutions. Moreover, the accord is still being 
implemented in the United States and elsewhere. Nevertheless, in 2004, 
the SEC decided to apply Basel II when setting capital requirements for 
certain large financial-holding companies as part of the Commission’s 
new Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Program.121 In particular, the 
SEC allowed these holding companies to use their internal risk models 
to set their own regulatory capital. The creation of the CSE Program was 
driven in part by lobbying by large U.S. financial conglomerates for 
more flexible capital requirements that would give these firms greater 
ability to compete with foreign competitors.122 
Broker-dealer holding companies could opt into this program, after 
which the SEC would supervise not only registered broker-dealer 
entities, which it has historically regulated, but unregulated affiliates and 
the holding-company parents of those broker-dealers. According to the 
SEC, the program was “designed to allow the Commission to monitor 
for financial or operational weakness in a CSE holding company or its 
                                                     
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n120a.pdf; Paul H. Kupiec, Capital 
Adequacy and Basel II (FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2004-02, 2004), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2004/wp2004/CFRWP_2004-02_Kupiec.pdf, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n120b.pdf 
(concluding that Basel II’s Internal Ratings-Based Approach drastically undercapitalizes portfolio 
credit risk); Paul H. Kupiec, Capital Allocation for Portfolio Credit Risk (Dec. 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=681201, permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n120c.pdf. 
121. Final Rule: Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of 
Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 
21, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.htm, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n121.pdf. 
122. Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2008, at A1. 
The program also responded in part to a European Union (EU) regulatory initiative that would 
give a non-EU financial conglomerate the ability to obtain a single license to operate across the EU, 
provided that the firm demonstrated that it (i.e., all the firm’s affiliates on a consolidated basis) was 
subject to sufficient regulatory supervision by a single home-country regulator. Unless U.S. 
financial conglomerates were bank holding companies and thus subject to ultimate supervision by 
the Federal Reserve, they would not qualify for special EU status. U.S investment banks not owned 
by a bank-holding company thus found themselves at a potential regulatory disadvantage. Id. See 
also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED 
ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 4 (2008), Report No. 446-B (Sept. 
25, 2008), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n122.pdf. 
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unregulated affiliates that might place . . . U.S. regulated broker-dealers 
and other regulated entities at risk.”123 Ultimately, the following seven 
financial-holding companies, which included the largest U.S. 
investment-banking firms, joined the CSE program: the Bear Stearns 
Companies, Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch & Co., Citigroup Inc., and 
JP Morgan Chase & Co.124 
With respect to these CSEs, the SEC took responsibility for setting 
regulatory capital. But it decided not to apply the same capital-standard 
regulatory framework that it had applied to SEC-registered broker-
dealers before the CSE Program. That standard framework, also known 
as the Net Capital Rule,125 requires that broker-dealers maintain capital 
according to fairly mechanical financial ratios that vary according to the 
types of securities business that a broker-dealer is conducting. Instead of 
this approach, the SEC allowed CSEs to set capital requirements 
according to internal risk models. After the CSE rules took effect in 
2004, the regulatory capital of those entities admitted to the program 
dropped. At the same time, these firms dramatically increased their level 
of borrowing to finance investments, as documented by soaring leverage 
ratios.126 
The SEC regulations establishing the program included standards for 
the SEC in both vetting holding companies applying to join the program 
(including standards for examining the quality of each applicant’s risk-
management policies and risk modeling) and auditing those companies 
that were admitted to the program. The rules also contained a floor 
below which a CSE’s capital could not fall. In spite of this, a 2008 SEC 
Inspector General Report detailed significant lapses by the SEC in 
following its own regulations in vetting program applicants and the 
adequacy of their risk models, and auditing the risk management and 
modeling of those firms admitted to the program.127 
                                                     
123. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at 4. 
124. Id. at iv. The SEC exercised direct oversight, including with respect to capital requirements 
for five of these firms; Citigroup and JP Morgan continued to have the Federal Reserve as their 
principal regulator. Id. at v. 
125. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009). 
126. See Labaton, supra note 122, at A1. 
127. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at ix, xi–xii. 
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iv.  Hedging Risks: Derivatives and Hedge Funds 
Banks and non-banks alike use not only capital to mitigate risk, but 
increasingly use derivatives as well. More particularly, banks and other 
investors have used derivatives to hedge the risks of asset-backed 
securities in their portfolios—including the credit risk posed by payment 
default on those securities. The derivatives employed for this purpose 
and for hedging other risks have become increasingly complex and 
esoteric over the last fifteen years. During the same time, trading in 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives has skyrocketed.128 
Simultaneously, the amount of money under management globally by 
unregulated hedge funds has exploded.129 These three phenomena—risks 
from asset-backed securities, the expansion of derivatives markets, and 
the growth of hedge funds—are intertwined, as explained in the 
following paragraphs. Although derivatives can be used for many 
reasons, they are often used as a consequence of securitization. Investors 
can hedge the residual credit risk associated with asset-backed securities 
in their portfolios by entering into a special type of derivative 
transaction, called a credit default swap, with a counterparty. Under a 
credit default swap, this counterparty will pay the investor a specified 
amount upon the occurrence of a contractually defined “credit event,” 
e.g., non-payment by the issuing SIV on the asset-backed security held 
by the investor. In exchange for assuming this measure of default risk, 
the counterparty receives a premium from the investor.130 The 
transaction thus resembles a form of guarantee or credit insurance policy 
on the asset-backed security.131 
                                                     
128. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY: FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN 2007, 2–3 (Dec. 2007). 
129. John H. Makin, Hedge Funds: Origin and Evolution, AEI POLICY SERIES – AEI ONLINE, 
May 15, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24395/pub_detail.asp, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n129.pdf. 
130. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing 
Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 89 (2008). 
131. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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Diagram D sketches out the basic economic bargain of a credit default 
swap.132 
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Counterparties thus reap significant rewards but take on significant 
risks. Because this risk may be too much for regulated financial 
institutions to bear legally, unregulated hedge funds comprise a 
significant percentage of counterparties to derivatives.133 
Just as in the stages of a securitization, code—in the form of the same 
types of computer-based risk models—enables and drives hedging. Both 
                                                     
132. For the sake of simplicity, this diagram removes the originator. If the originator is deemed to 
have made a “true sale” of the assets to the SIV, the assets are no longer considered part of the 
estate of the originator in bankruptcy. The SIV is then the outright owner of the consumer 
mortgages, and the originator no longer has any impact on the risk being transferred from borrowers 
to the SIV and investors. For a discussion of “true sales” in securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1543–48 (2004). 
133. For an analysis of the extensive use by hedge funds of credit derivatives, see Noah L. 
Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit 
Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2008) (arguing that heavy use of lightly regulated credit 
derivatives by unregulated hedge funds increases systemic risk). 
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derivative parties must assess the risks involved to price the contract, yet 
without sophisticated models, pricing becomes impossible. But 
modeling becomes more difficult because derivatives lay a further step 
removed from their underlying assets. Therefore, modeling how risks in 
the underlying mortgages affect derivatives requires either more 
powerful models and detailed information on the underlying assets on 
the one hand, or a set of simplifying assumptions on the other. One 
simplifying assumption is to rely on previous rating agency 
determinations; to avoid performing a thorough analysis of the credit 
risk on the underlying assets, a credit default swap model could simply 
use a rating agency rating as a proxy for credit risk.134 
 The complexity of credit default swaps and other derivatives led to 
great deference by regulators, who struggled to keep pace even as 
derivatives became more complex and the derivative market expanded. 
Regulators have been reluctant to regulate OTC derivatives for fear of 
stifling innovation in the spreading of risk.135 Regulators have placed 
great faith in the capacity of the market to self-regulate derivatives, and 
this self-regulation rests ultimately on the perceived strength of the risk 
models that are used to price derivatives.136 
Hedge funds have received similar regulatory deference, as some U.S. 
regulators have argued that regulation is unnecessary because market 
counterparties, armed with sophisticated pricing models, provide the 
necessary discipline against excessive risk-taking.137 Meanwhile, the 
SEC was stymied in its efforts to require hedge funds to register with the 
Commission and provide basic data to the SEC.138 
v. Iterations: CDOs and Derivatives to the nth Power 
The discussion thus far has greatly oversimplified the structure of 
asset-backed securities and derivatives. For example, securitizations can 
                                                     
134. See Willem H. Buiter, Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC 
POLICY RESEARCH POLICY INSIGHT NO. 18, 2–3 (Dec. 2007) available at http://www.cepr.org/ 
pubs/PolicyInsights/PolicyInsight18.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington. 
edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n134.pdf. 
135. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
136. Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 343–46 
(describing flaws in value-at-risk models used to price derivatives, since these models are only 
“backtested” by regulators). 
137. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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become even more complex when mortgage-backed securities (or other 
asset-backed securities) are themselves securitized. As Diagram E below 
illustrates, a new SIV could purchase these mortgage-backed securities 
and use them as collateral for another securitization, often called a 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO).139 
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Securities issued in CDOs are often resecuritized themselves, creating 
what is called a “CDO-squared.”140 The iterative layering of 
securitizations of securitizations of securitizations became wildly 
popular in financial markets in the last seven years.141 Similarly, 
investors who assumed risks in derivative transactions could then hedge 
those risks with other derivatives.142 
But, complexity of securitizations of securitizations and derivatives 
hedging derivatives makes modeling the risks involved frighteningly 
difficult. Each layer of a securitization of a securitization moves further 
away from the underlying assets where risk originates. This makes 
predicting, for example, the effects of widespread default on the ultimate 
underlying assets as they cascade through the securitization chain 
exponentially more complex.143 
Just as with a basic securitization or credit default swap, modelers 
looking to measure the credit risk of the securities issued in a CDO-
                                                     
139. Kendall, supra note 76, at 15. 
140. Coval et al., supra note 77, at 10. 
141. Unterman, supra note 130, at 70. One presidential commission cited failures of rating 
agencies to evaluate securitizations of mortgage-backed securities as a key factor in the subprime 
crisis. President’s Working Group, supra note 70, at 449. 
142. Hu, supra note 9, at 1502. 
143. Kendall, supra note 76, at 8–11 (describing valuation of “synthetic securities”). 
AUTHOR_FINAL_EDITS_GERDING_5-22-09B.DOC 6/7/2009  6:51 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:127, 2009 
164 
squared face high costs in identifying—let alone finding information 
about the credit risk posed by—the numerous underlying mortgages and 
other cash-producing assets that ultimately back the CDO-squared. 
These modelers again make simplifying assumptions, such as relying on 
the credit ratings assigned to the securities immediately prior in the 
securitization chain. Using rating agencies as an analytic shortcut, 
however, places a great deal of faith in the accuracy and integrity of 
those ratings. 
C. The Crash of the New Financial Code: A Thumbnail Sketch 
The proliferation of code throughout the web of financial markets 
described above in Part I.B had dire consequences, as the crash of 
multiple codes was a driving factor of the subprime crisis. The crisis has 
numerous causes and has unfolded (and continues to unfold) in 
incredibly complex ways that will occupy economists for decades. The 
following paragraphs present merely a thumbnail sketch of the crisis to 
highlight the extent to which the various risk models described in Part 
I.B failed. 
The subprime crisis began in 2007, when defaults on ARMs began 
rising as teaser rates on ARMs expired, leaving many subprime 
borrowers unable to make payments at the higher reset rate.144 Rising 
market interest rates cut off the exit options for borrowers by both 
making refinancing prohibitively expensive and drying up the resale 
market; home prices began to level or drop in many markets after years 
of steady gains.145 The pricing and risk models of many originators and 
rating agencies utterly failed to predict the waves of defaults by 
mortgage borrowers that followed.146 
The wave of defaults swelled enough to affect mortgage-backed 
securities. First, junior classes plummeted in value.147 Later waves of 
defaults undermined the value of senior classes, despite the protections 
of payment waterfalls and tranching structures.148 Defaults on asset-
                                                     
144. Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, 
at C1. 
145. Id. See also Jia Lynn Yang, How Bad is the Mortgage Crisis Going to Get?, FORTUNE, Mar. 
31, 2008, at 88. 
146. Lowenstein, supra note 91. 
147. Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time Bomb Ticked, but Few Heard, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2007, at A1. 
148. Greg B. Cioffi, Collateralized Damage, DAILY DEAL, Feb. 1, 2008, available at 2008 
WLNR 1910083; Robert Stowe, Anatomy of a Meltdown, 68 MORTGAGE BANKING 38, Oct. 1, 
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backed securities triggered guarantees and credit-insurance policies, and 
unprepared guarantors and credit insurers themselves threatened to 
falter.149 
Growing losses for financial institutions on mortgages and 
mortgaged-backed securities created two aftershocks. First, lenders 
decreased mortgage and other lending, which drove market interest rates 
higher and started a credit crunch. The higher interest rates created a 
feedback loop, worsening default rates on ARMs.150 Second, the 
plummeting value of asset-backed securities forced many financial 
institutions to make substantial write-downs of assets on their balance 
sheets, a process that continues.151 The value of many of these assets has 
become extremely uncertain, since buyers for asset-backed securities 
have disappeared.152 In addition, the iteration of securitization upon 
securitization meant that default of one class of securitization cascaded 
and caused losses in subsequent securitizations. The many layers of 
securitization—CDOs backed by CDOs in an iterative chain—prevented 
investors later in the securitization chain from calculating the risk they 
faced from losses on assets earlier in the chain.153 
The write-down of assets began to affect the creditworthiness, real 
and perceived, of many institutional investors.154 Many investors were 
forced to sell asset-backed securities to improve their balance sheets,155 
but they faced a liquidity risk problem similar to that of mortgage-
holders; the initial depression of the prices of asset-backed securities, 
                                                     
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 21537515. 
149. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bond Insurer in Turmoil Turns to Familiar Lender, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, at C2. 
150. Shawn Tully, Risk Returns with a Vengeance, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at 50. 
151. Charles Duhigg, A Trickle that Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at C1 
(reporting that major banks are writing down twenty to fifty percent of the value of their assets due 
to losses from mortgage-backed securities). 
152. Louise Story, A Values Debate (Not the Political Kind), N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1 
(reporting on debate over whether mark-to-market rule in Financial Accounting Statement 157 was 
leading to overstated write-downs); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame?¸ 
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1 (same). 
153. Buiter, supra note 134, at 3. See also Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, 
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007, at 50 (linking Bear Stearns’ deteriorating credit situation to 
uncertain value of “CDO-squared” securities it held). 
154. Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2008, at A1 (describing contagious loss of investor and creditor confidence in U.S. investment 
banks). 
155. Liz Rappaport & Justin Lahart, Debt Reckoning: U.S. Receives a Margin Call, WALL. ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1. 
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combined with the volume of sellers in the market in the same 
predicament, sent the prices of these securities into a tailspin and dried 
up liquidity.156 
This created a reputation risk problem for many institutional 
investors. Creditors, including stock-lending and derivative 
counterparties, began worrying about the credit risk posed by many 
institutions and made margin calls.157 Many large commercial and 
investment banks were forced to seek emergency equity infusions to 
shore up their balance sheets, reassure creditors, and meet regulatory 
capital requirements.158 
A few prominent institutions failed in their attempts to stay afloat.159 
Threats to the solvency of financial institutions and hedge funds created 
fears of systemic risk and threatened to cause the collapse of other 
institutions because of the domino effects of credit and counterparty risk. 
Failure of one firm could trigger the collapse of other institutions 
because of the complex web of counterparty risk created by 
derivatives.160 Moreover, the contagion of depositor or creditor panic 
exacerbated reputation and systemic risk.161 
Some of the most prominent financial institutions that fell victim to 
the crisis were the financial conglomerates that were able to lower their 
regulatory capital and increase their leverage under the SEC’s CSE 
Program.162 The failure or threat of failure to these large institutions, 
including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, prompted extraordinary 
federal intervention into financial markets. 
A full listing, let alone explanation, of all these interventions is 
beyond the scope of this Article (and new massive interventions 
                                                     
156. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Are Squeezed by Investors and Lenders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2007, at C1. 
157. Id. 
158. See, e.g., Eric Dash, IndyMac Announces It Will Close Lending Units and Cut Half of Its 
Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C3; David Jolly, After Losses, UBS Seeks to Raise $15 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at C5. 
159. Goldstein & Henry, supra note 153 (reporting on bailout of Bear Stearns); Dash, supra note 
158 (reporting on insolvency of IndyMac Bank). 
160. Herring & Schuermann, supra note 45, at 22 (discussing systemic risk threat posed by 
securities firms by virtue of OTC derivatives activity). 
161. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C1 (reporting that potential failure of Bear Stearns’ hedge fund raised 
investor concerns over systemic risk). 
162. See Labaton, supra note 122, at A1; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws 
Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at A17. 
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continue to take shape even as it goes to press). Nevertheless, the sheer 
scope of the federal intervention and the magnitude of financial-
institution losses provide lurid evidence of the systemic failure of 
financial-institution risk models; these models failed to measure the risk 
of default by mortgage borrowers, price asset-backed securities or 
derivatives proportionate to their true risks, or ensure adequate hedging 
and risk management by financial institutions.163 
The failures of these risk models also signal a failure of the 
government agencies that outsourced financial regulatory responsibility 
to the models. As but one example, the SEC’s CSE Program has come 
under withering criticism, including from the Commission’s own Office 
of Inspector General. In a September 2008 study of the SEC’s 
contribution to the collapse of Bear Stearns, the Inspector General 
criticized the program for allowing CSEs to lower capital to inadequate 
levels. The study criticized the SEC for failures in both vetting firms 
(including vetting their risk models) that applied for CSE status and 
auditing firms (and their risk modeling) once they became CSEs.164 
 
D. Historical Parallels: The 1987 Crash and the Failure of Long-
Term Capital Management 
Two financial crises in the last two decades—the 1987 stock market 
crash and the demise of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998—have 
sobering parallels to the current crisis. In both earlier events, as in the 
ongoing “subprime” episode, flawed financial modeling enabled by 
sophisticated software exacerbated a market crisis, with regulators left 
unprepared. 
i. The 1987 Crash 
The 1987 stock market crash was aggravated, if not caused by, the 
widespread use of novel forms of computer-based hedging of risks 
called portfolio insurance and program trading.165 Regulators and 
                                                     
163. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 2, 2009, at 26–33, 46, 50. 
164. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at 17–23 (criticizing of vetting of CSE 
risk assessment); 24–27 (criticizing of vetting of CSE risk modeling). 
165. Ross M. Miller, The Leap from Free Markets to Autonomous Markets, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 295 (2006); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial 
Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 341. 
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scholars blamed the crisis on financial institutions that had placed their 
risk hedging on virtual autopilot.166 Poorly understood computer-based 
models were allowed to set major investment and risk management 
decisions.167 Homogeneity in these models, combined with poor 
operational oversight, led many institutional investors to begin selling 
off the same assets simultaneously at the occurrence of what seemed to 
be a minor market blip.168 This caused falling stock market indexes to 
drop precipitously.169 In the aftermath, studies criticized regulators for 
failing to understand and adequately regulate portfolio insurance and 
program trading.170 
ii. The Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
Misplaced faith in computer-based risk models led to another dire 
financial crisis over a decade after the 1987 Crash, when the Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund collapsed in 1998. This fund 
had used mathematical models to set investment strategies in exotic 
financial products, including asset-backed securities.171 The principals of 
the fund believed that they could identify outsized profit opportunities 
with minimal risk because their computer-based models could calculate 
risk with precision based on massive amounts of data on historic market 
volatility.172 But these models made many assumptions, including that: 
• future market movements would follow historical patterns; 
• historical market data inputted into the models covered a 
sufficiently long period of time; 
• market losses were essentially random instead of correlated; 
and 
• the distribution of gains and losses followed a normal 
distribution.173 
                                                     
166. Miller, supra note 165. 
167. For an account of the role of portfolio insurance in the 1987 crash, see generally RICHARD 
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 9–31 (2007). 
168. Id. at 17. 
169. Id. at 17–24. 
170. See generally David D. Haddock, An Economic Analysis of the Brady Report: Public 
Interest, Special Interest, or Rent Extraction, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1989). 
171. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 62–69 (2000). 
172. Id. at 63–65. 
173. Id. at 64–77. LTCM’s models also assumed that the volatility of any security remains 
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Based on these assumptions, LTCM assumed it could effectively 
manage a portfolio of complex financial instruments with little risk; if 
markets moved according to LTCM’s models, the fund could readjust its 
portfolio and enter into and unwind hedges before it incurred major 
losses.174 
These assumptions and the core faith of LTCM and its investors in the 
perfection of the fund’s models proved disastrously misplaced. Russia’s 
unexpected default on its sovereign debt in August 1998 caused 
enormous and historically unusual volatility across the world’s capital 
markets and a sudden, sharp increase in credit spreads.175 This 
unexpected movement in credit markets caused massive losses for 
LTCM.176 Fear that these losses would lead to the cascading failures of 
major financial institutions prompted the Federal Reserve to orchestrate 
a bailout of the fund by major investment banks, many of whom faced 
potentially massive losses due to trades with LTCM.177 
II. MODEL RISK: DIAGNOSTICS ON THE CRASH OF CODE 
The scope of the current global financial crisis and the necessity of 
massive government intervention demonstrate the failure of the risk 
models throughout the web. 
This Part seeks to explain several of the weaknesses inherent in these 
models—the new financial code—that contributed to this failure. Given 
that the crisis continues to unfold, and collecting extensive empirical 
data on model failures remains a work in progress, this Part does not 
attempt to quantify the relative causal contributions of any one of these 
weaknesses to the crisis. Instead, it provides a typography of various 
flaws that contributed to yet another risk—“model risk,” which describes 
potential losses due to inaccurate risk models themselves.178 
                                                     
constant and that securities trade in “continuous time” with no significant gaps between the posting 
of new prices for securities. Id. at 68. 
174. Id. at 68. 
175. Id. at 140–41, 144–45. 
176. Id. at 145–47. 
177. Id. at 185–218. 
178. For a discussion of model risk, see Toshiyasu Kato & Toshinao Yoshiba, Model Risk and Its 
Control, BANK OF JAPAN MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (Dec. 2000), available at 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/mes/2000/me18-2-5.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n178a.pdf; see also Ingo Fender & John 
Kiff, CDO Rating Methodology: Some Thoughts on Model Risk and Its Implications (Bank for 
International Settlements, Working Paper No. 163, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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These flaws fall into two broad categories: flaws in the technical 
design of the models, and flaws stemming from the skewed incentives of 
the parties who select, implement, and use those models. These two 
sources of weakness are difficult to disentangle. Indeed, aspects of risk-
modeling technology, including its inherent complexity, can facilitate its 
manipulation by self-interested actors. Part II.A examines the failure of 
the new financial code starting from the vantage point of flaws in 
technical design. Part II.B analyzes the “user interface” of the code, with 
a primary focus on the agency costs that affect the incentives of those 
individuals working in financial institutions who select and use different 
risk models. 
A. Design Flaws 
i. Non-Robust Model Assumptions 
The most simple and, at the same time, most complex explanation for 
the failure of codes is that they were built on flawed assumptions. These 
models, like any financial or scientific models, make simplifying 
assumptions about market behavior in order to generate predictions in 
the face of complexity. Policymakers and scholars have speculated that 
the root of the failure of risk modeling was simply non-robust 
assumptions and inadequate stress testing,179 and back testing180 of 
models to root out these faulty assumptions.181 
Some policymakers and scholars have faulted the value-at-risk 
models used by financial institutions for having improper parameters, 
such as too low of a confidence interval or an unrealistic assumption of 
the length of the period in which the institution would hold the 
investment portfolio.182 Other critics fault modelers for not going back 
                                                     
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=623662, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington. 
edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n178b.pdf. 
179. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a definition of stress testing. 
180. Id. 
181. Oddly, though one of the most outspoken champions of the capacity of risk models (and 
other aspects of the new financial code), Alan Greenspan (see supra notes 17 and 21) now attributes 
the cause of the subprime crisis to flaws in risk-model assumptions. Alan Greenspan, We Will Never 
Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008; see also Jón Daníelsson, Blame the 
Models, __ J. FIN. STABILITY __ (forthcoming 2008) available at http://risk.lse.ac.uk/rr/files/JD-
33.pdf, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n181.pdf. 
182. The basic construction of a value-at-risk model is outlined in notes 48–51 supra. 
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far enough in history to gather loss data to be inputted into the model.183 
Indeed, small sample sizes of historical losses can skew results.184 For 
example, a model used in 2006 based on data on market movements in 
the previous seven years would have missed valuable data points such as 
the 1998 LTCM crisis.185 If that same 2006 model had used data from 
the previous 15 years, it would not have factored data from the 1987 
stock-market crash.186 Some policymakers and scholars also fault models 
that do not capture risk probabilities that have “fat-tails,” i.e., for not 
properly measuring lower-probability, but high-magnitude risks.187 
Economists have noted that small errors in assumptions in modeling 
the risk of the assets underlying a securitization can lead to dramatic 
errors in modeling the risk associated with asset-backed securities. This 
initial error is magnified further when modeling the risk of 
securitizations of those asset-backed securities (CDOs), and magnified 
even more for subsequent securitizations (CDOs-squared).188 
These technical flaws can be solved with technical fixes, including 
stress testing value-at-risk determinations using different confidence 
levels and different model assumptions.189 However, the argument that 
risk model approaches basically work, but that technical glitches need to 
be fixed, offers a dangerously incomplete account of the current 
financial crisis. The fact that so many financial institutions incurred such 
large losses (forcing the federal government to make unprecedented 
interventions in the market) suggests that there was something 
systemically wrong with either the models or their implementation. 
                                                     
183. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION JOINT FORUM, CROSS-SECTORAL REVIEW OF 
GROUP-WIDE IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF RISK CONCENTRATIONS (Apr. 2008), 
available at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Cross-sectoral_review_of_group-wide_identification_ 
and_management_of_risk_concentrations__April_2008.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n183.pdf. 
184. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION JOINT FORUM, CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (July 2008) 
(proposing standards for quality control of market risk models). 
185. See supra Part I.D.ii. 
186. See supra Part I.D.i. 
187. Daníelsson, supra note 181. 
188. Coval et al., supra note 77, at 10. 
189. More complicated statistical methods, including Extreme Value Theory, can build further 
nuance into models to compensate for the potential of “fat-tails.” For a detailed academic work on 
such statistical techniques, see PAUL EMBRECHTS ET AL., MODELLING EXTREMAL EVENTS FOR 
INSURANCE AND FINANCE (2003). Technical fixes and additional stress testing and back testing 
appears to be the approach favored by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See, e.g., 
supra notes 183–184. 
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ii. The Radical Critique: The Failure of Models in the Face of 
Uncertainty 
In stark contrast to the previous explanation, Nicholas Taleb presents 
a more radical technocratic critique of risk modeling, namely that value-
at-risk determinations, including those based on Monte Carlo 
simulations, are deeply flawed because future losses are unknown and 
unknowable and cannot be predicted based on historical patterns. In 
other words, Taleb argues that losses in the future are characterized by 
“uncertainty” rather than “risk.”190 He claims that markets continue to 
evolve and defy historical patterns; “one-hundred-year floods” (what he 
has famously labeled “black swans”) occur frequently, but the timing, 
magnitude, and the exact mix of risks posed by these crises defy 
prediction and probabilistic thinking. Therefore, even sophisticated 
probabilistic models, such as value-at-risk determinations, according to 
him, are useless.191 
While philosophically provocative, Taleb’s radical critique has 
uncertain practical implications. If losses are inherently unknowable, it 
is unclear how investors would ever estimate losses or even make basic 
investment decisions. It is also unclear how regulators should establish 
risk regulations, such as traditional regulatory capital requirements. 
iii. Risk Correlation 
There is another fundamental problem with value-at-risk modeling 
practice that is less ethereal than Taleb’s critique. Risk models often 
underestimate or completely overlook the correlation of losses among 
various assets pooled together—whether they are mortgages pooled 
together to back mortgage-backed securities, or different assets held in a 
diversified investment portfolio. A high correlation of losses for 
different assets pooled together means that when losses do occur, they 
can be massive. A loss on one asset may not be offset by gains on other 
assets. High correlation of losses—when it rains, it pours—undermines 
the foundations of diversification and risk pooling on which effective 
risk management depends.192 
                                                     
190. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
191. Nicholas Taleb & Avital Pilpel, Epistemology and Risk Management, RISK & REG. (Summer 
2007), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/riskAndRegulationMagazine/magazine/ 
summer2007/epistemologyAndRiskManagement.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law. 
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n191.pdf. 
192. Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: an Analysis of the Subprime-
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Effective securitization also depends on low correlation of losses on 
underlying assets. In other words, one of the key benefits of 
securitization—diversification by pooling assets—may rest on the 
unfounded assumption that losses on those assets are not correlated. 
Several economists have noted how the current crisis revealed the 
fallacy of this assumption. The error in this assumption led to massive 
losses because of the way in which errors in assumptions with respect to 
underlying assets are compounded as those assets are securitized and re-
securitized.193 
iv.  Spillover Effects and Feedback Loops 
Losses within different asset classes—mortgages, mortgage-backed 
securities, other asset-backed securities—can become highly correlated 
for several reasons. First, financial losses on one asset can have spillover 
effects and drag down the value of similar assets. For example, a 
foreclosed home lowers the value of neighboring properties. Securities 
that fall in price may drag down the prices of similar securities, 
particularly when investors do not have adequate information to 
distinguish how underlying risks may differ among securities. A lack of 
distinguishing information may lead even rational investors to join a 
sell-off. Prospects of a deep sell-off increase due to fear by individual 
investors that other investors will sell.194 
A second form of spillover effect occurs when losses do not stay in 
the tidy boxes of risk categories outlined in Part I.A.i—credit risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk, etc.195 Instead, losses that fall within one 
                                                     
Mortgage Financial Crisis 16 (Nov. 2008) (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
Bonn 2008/43), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309442, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n192.pdf. 
See also Coval et al., supra note 77, at 27–28. 
193. Coval et al., supra note 77, at 10. 
194. Mitchell Y. Abolafia & Martin Kilduff, Enacting Market Crisis: the Social Construction of a 
Speculative Bubble, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 177 (1988). A sell-off need not be explained solely by 
irrational panic driven by behavioral biases. Investors who sell off may be completely rational in 
seeking to avoid losses driven by other investors selling in a panic. Information cascades may also 
offer a partial explanation. Michael P. Dooley & Carl E. Walsh, Academic Views of Capital Flows: 
an Expanding Universe, Reserve Bank of Australia Conference Volume, 89, 100 (1999), available 
at http://www.rba.gov.au/publicationsandresearch/Conferences/1999/DooleyWalsh.pdf, permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n194.pdf. 
195. Some scholars have argued that because one particular financial loss may qualify as both a 
credit risk and market risk, models may therefore double-count risk and lead to overly conservative 
risk management. Bhala, supra note 10, at 149–51. 
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category of risk may spill over and trigger losses from an altogether 
different form of risk. Consider the following characterization of the 
spreading financial crisis described in Part I.C: 
• Market risk triggers credit risk: An unexpected rise in 
interest rates causes borrowers to default on obligations or 
become insolvent. This causes their lenders and derivative 
counterparties to realize credit risk. 
• Credit risk triggers liquidity risk: The increased credit risk on 
lenders and counterparties causes them to sell assets to 
prevent a decline in their own creditworthiness. Market-wide 
sell-offs of the same class of assets cause prices of those 
assets to plummet and magnify liquidity risk. 
• Liquidity risk feeds back into credit and market risk: 
Plummeting prices from asset fire sales cause holders of those 
assets to realize additional market risk. The inability of firms 
to sell assets at historical market prices also deteriorates their 
creditworthiness and increases the credit risk of their 
creditors. 
• The above risks compound reputation and systemic risk: A 
financial institution’s deteriorating creditworthiness (or even 
apparent deterioration among other firms) can cause a run on 
the institution. Runs on multiple financial institutions worsen 
systemic risk. 
The foregoing example demonstrates that spillover effects may create 
feedback loops. If rising interest rates increase mortgage defaults, which 
cause larger losses to lenders, who consequently cut back on extending 
new credit, then interest rates will rise further and provide more fuel to 
the cycle. 
Moreover, the foregoing example illustrates how spillover effects and 
feedback loops can also transform credit risk and market risk into more 
complex forms of risk, such as liquidity risk. In the current crisis, when 
credit and market risk led to sufficient defaults in mortgages and asset-
backed securities, owners of both foreclosed properties and asset-backed 
securities struggled to find buyers for their assets.196 A loss of liquidity 
caused markets and credit to seize up, making assets extremely difficult 
to value and, in some cases, worthless.197 
                                                     
196. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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Yet liquidity risk can arise from complex interactions of market and 
credit risk, including when one form of risk has spillover effects on 
another or exacerbates the other through feedback loops. Accordingly, it 
is extremely difficult to model liquidity risk, and the models have not 
developed to anywhere near the extent of models for credit and market 
risk. For similar reasons, systemic risk—the granddaddy of all risks—
also proves resistant to modeling.198 Risk models (and regulations) that 
segregate risks into separate analytic categories of credit, market, and 
other forms of risk can severely underestimate risk.199 
Homogeneity among risk models exacerbates this problem as it 
means models at different firms miss the same risks, creating universal 
blind spots. As Part II.B.vi explains, homogenous risk models also 
translate into homogenous risk-management practices, meaning that 
investor reactions to market downturns will be highly synchronized, 
thereby deepening market disruption. 
v. Interface Between Codes: Information Gaps 
Assuming that originator models were highly robust and based on 
correct information and extensive data, other financial institutions down 
the securitization chain often lacked access to these models or their data. 
Each separate stage in the securitization process creates information 
gaps; as mortgages are transferred from borrower to originator to SIV to 
investors, information on the risk of those mortgages is progressively 
“destroyed.”200 As in a child’s game of “telephone,” the end investors of 
a securitization receive poor information about the underlying assets.201 
But even these investors have better information than their 
counterparties in a credit default swap. 
Investor and hedge counterparties alike may take an analytic shortcut 
by relying on the ratings of rating agencies. Rating agencies also suffer 
                                                     
198. Andrew Haldane et al., Financial Stability and Bank Solvency, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL 
CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 83, 109–10 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. 
Kaufman eds., 2005) (noting methodological challenges to measuring systemic risk). 
199. Of course, some scholars argue that segregating risk into different types and different 
models may lead to overestimation of risk because separate credit and market risk models may 
overlap and capture the same losses—ultimately leading to double-counting and excessive capital 
requirements. See Bhala, supra note 10, at 150–51. But this contention assumes that the separate 
models capture the non-linear interactive effects of risks (or, more precisely, that the amount of 
double-counting outweighs the amount of undercounting). 
200. Buiter, supra note 134, at 3–4. 
201. Id. 
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from asymmetric information, however, and critics have been faulted for 
a dismal performance in predicting credit problems.202 Part II.B.iv 
explains how the incentives of originators and rating agencies 
exacerbated the loss of information in the gaps between models. 
vi. Flaws in Modeling Human Behavior 
1. Bounded Rationality: The “Killer App” for Behavioral Law and 
Economics 
At its core, modeling financial risk faces the challenge of modeling 
individual behavior. For example, securitization begins with models and 
marketing code employed by originators to determine which loans 
consumers will purchase, and when consumers will default. Further 
down the chain, risk-management models employed by financial 
institutions must factor in how other investors will buy and sell asset-
backed securities to calculate market risk and liquidity risk. Modeling 
behavior is greatly simplified by assuming individuals are rational 
actors. 
But behavioral economics has offered substantial empirical and 
experimental evidence that the rationality of individuals is bounded. 
Pioneering work in psychology demonstrated that individuals exhibit 
various cognitive biases, such as overconfidence, over-optimism and the 
availability bias, and employ heuristics to estimate probabilities.203 
Consumer-law scholars have argued that these examples of bounded 
rationality-lead consumers to make suboptimal borrowing choices and to 
choose financial products that are not in their long-term self interest.204 
Behavioral-finance scholars have posited that bounded rationality causes 
investors to make suboptimal investment choices and leads to financial-
market failures.205 A subsequent wave of behavioral-economics 
scholarship, particularly in behavioral finance, tied behavioral biases to 
financial-market anomalies that cannot be squared with rational investor 
behavior and market efficiency.206 In recent years, economists and legal 
                                                     
202. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 658–61. 
203. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 
(1998). 
204. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 63. 
205. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
206. Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B HANDBOOK OF 
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1054, 1075–1105 (George M Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). 
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scholars have explored the particular behavioral biases that affect 
individuals in the real-estate and subprime-mortgage markets.207 
Behavioral economics has faced trenchant criticisms. Notably, 
Professor Gregory Mitchell208 has argued that behavioral economics 
presents general tendencies, but has yet to delineate the boundaries of 
those tendencies.209 In other words, behavioral economics produces 
evidence that behavioral biases occur, but has not specified when those 
biases occur.210 This failure to specify boundary conditions means that 
behavioral economics struggles to produce models of human behavior 
that can lead to testable predictions.211 
This criticism can be flipped and applied not only to the modeling of 
scholars, but also to the modeling used by financial institutions to 
predict consumer and investor behavior. Prediction of human behavior 
by financial modeling is frustrated by the lack of defined boundaries to 
behavioral biases. This lack of definition obscures the thresholds and 
magnitude of the effects of behavioral biases. Thus, the higher the 
probability that a behavioral bias will be salient in a given context, the 
more uncertainty it threatens to add to risk modeling. Demonstrating the 
flaws in private industry risk models may prove the “killer 
application”212 of behavioral economics. 
Behavioral economics also argues for revisiting the work of consumer 
law scholars such as Professors Warren, Bar-Gill, and Willis to 
underscore a nuance in their arguments. When these scholars argue that 
                                                     
207. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money 
Illusion and Housing Frenzies, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 135 (2008); Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 
2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008). 
208. See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral 
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781 (2003) (arguing that behavioral law-and-economics 
proponents have documented “tendencies” in behavioral biases, but have yet to specify the 
“boundaries” of those tendencies, i.e., when, and the extent to which, these biases come into play); 
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1559–60 (1998) (faulting behavioral law-and-economics scholars for failing to offer a theory 
capable of generating testable predictions that would rival the predictive power of rational-choice 
economics). 
209. Mitchell, supra note 208, at 1804–11. 
210. Id. 
211. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 122–23 (2002). 
212. In its original computer-programming context, a “killer application” (or “killer app”) is a 
piece of software, the popularity of which drives demand for the underlying platform on which the 
software runs. STEVE JONES, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW MEDIA 172 (2003). 
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data-mining and computer-based models allow financial institutions to 
predict consumer defaults, they are writing of a relative information 
advantage compared to consumers.213 The subprime crisis suggests that 
originator models can also suffer severe flaws in predicting consumer 
behavior. Severe losses and insolvencies experienced by originators due 
to mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that they retained suggest 
that mortgage originators did have an incentive to accurately model 
consumer behavior, but that they severely miscalculated the level of 
consumers defaulting on more complex mortgages.214  
2. Modeling and Complex Adaptive Systems 
Even assuming the perfect rationality of individuals, models may fail 
due to the inherent complexity of financial systems. Complexity science 
is a somewhat amorphous interdisciplinary field in which economists, 
computer scientists, and natural scientists study how simple interactions 
between adaptive agents (which could mean anything from investors in a 
market to organisms in an ecosystem to cells within an organism) can 
evolve into increasingly complex adaptive systems.215 The ability of 
agents to adapt to the changes in the system, including those caused by 
the interaction of the agents, leads the overall system—the market, 
ecosystem or organism—to develop in nonlinear ways.216 
                                                     
213. See supra notes 62–64, and accompanying text. 
214. John Kiff & Paul S. Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets, (IMF Working Paper No. 07-188, 2007), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n214.pdf. 
215. Complex adaptive systems are systems in which multiple independent agents interact with 
one another. The capacity of the agents to adapt to changes in the system causes the system to 
evolve into progressively more complex forms and to change in a non-linear manner. Simon A. 
Levin, Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, Unknown and the Unknowable, 40 BULL. 
AM. MATH. SOC’Y 3, 4 (2002) (defining complex adaptive systems). 
216. Id. The complex interactions of agents on the micro level frustrate the prediction of changes 
to the overall system due to a feature of complex adaptive systems called “emergence.” Emergence 
has been defined as: 
[T]he appearance of unforeseen qualities from the self-organizing interaction of large numbers 
of objects, which cannot be understood through study of any one of the objects. The key to 
emergence is understanding that the emergent behaviors of dynamical systems are high-level 
patterns arising from the indescribably complex interaction of lower-level subsystems. Hence, 
removing or otherwise changing any interacting component of the system potentially changes 
the entire system since the interactions leading to the global emergent behaviors may no longer 
be possible. 
J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System: A Wake-
Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 877–78 
(1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
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A financial market is a complex adaptive system217 and may therefore 
exhibit nonlinear behavior218 and suffer bouts of disequilibrium and 
unpredictable swings.219 Accordingly, models of market risk may suffer 
spectacular failures.220 
The logic of complexity science may have other applications to risk 
modeling. Risk models and risk management cannot assume a static 
view of the market. Even acting within a set of risk models and risk-
management policies based on those models, individuals at financial 
institutions have a strong incentive to look for innovative ways to 
achieve abnormal returns.221 Individuals adapt to the behavior of other 
players in the market. Individuals also adapt to the set of legal rules 
designed to constrain their behavior. Their adaptive responses lead to 
innovations in investment strategies and financial products, which adds 
new complexities not considered by previous models to the market.222 
                                                     
217. See, e.g., Cars H. Hommes, Financial Markets as Nonlinear Adaptive Evolutionary Systems, 
1 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 149 (2001). 
218. Risk models or regulations that rely on linear causality falter when applied to complex 
adaptive systems. Professor J.B. Ruhl has written extensively on the failures of law to manage non-
linear causality. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How 
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 979 
(1997) (criticizing environmental statutes for this flaw). 
219. John Foster, From Simplistic to Complex Systems in Economics, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 
873 (2005). Many complex adaptive systems may tend towards disequilibrium because of the 
concept of emergence (described supra note 216). Ruhl, supra note 218, at 990–91. 
220. See generally Alejando Reveiz Herault & Sebastian Rojas, The Case for Active Management 
from the Perspective of Complexity Theory, 495 Borradores de Economía, 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra495.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n220.pdf. Cf. CARLO C. JAEGER ET AL., 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND RATIONAL ACTION (2001). Legal scholars have analyzed how individuals 
severely underestimate risk when confronted with complex adaptive systems. E.g., Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry 
Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1724–26 (2006) (discussing accounting firms’ 
underestimation of their legal exposure); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks 
to Chaotic Crashes, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994). 
221. During asset-price booms, individuals also have a strong incentive to violate internal 
controls and regulations. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth 
and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 424–41 (2006) (analyzing how 
dynamics of asset-price bubbles and other booms undermine incentives to comply with securities 
regulation). Non-compliance with laws and other agency costs are discussed in Part II.B infra. 
222. At the same time, rule-makers and regulators may also be adapting their behavior to meet 
the adaptive behavior of players in the financial markets. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, 
Incomplete Law — A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of 
Financial Market Regulation, 35 J. INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003). This adds yet another level of 
complexity to modeling the behavior of consumers, investors and markets. 
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One adaptive response is to game-risk models. For example, traders in 
financial institutions can game-value-at-risk models through a practice 
called “stuffing risk into the tails.” Under this practice, traders would 
take “asymmetric risk positions,” i.e., make investments that should 
average small gains, but have a small probability of very large losses. 
These large losses lie in the “fat tail” of a loss curve and outside a value-
at-risk measurement.223 
B. User Interface: Human Agency and Agency Costs 
The failure of code to adequately model human behavior dovetails 
with another failure of models in considering the human element. 
Financial models and other code failed in the subprime crisis not only 
because of problems with their internal assumptions or with modeling 
human behavior, but also because of human error in applying the 
models. The use of the term “code” does not imply that risk models are 
self-executing. Human agents design, select, and implement models. But 
along with human agency comes agency costs, as the individuals in 
charge of designing, choosing, and implementing models can fail to take 
sufficient care or act selfishly. Agency costs appear first in the design 
and selection of models and second in how models are implemented.224 
i. Selecting Code: Model Fit or Fitting the Model? 
Ideally, individuals who design or select risk and pricing models 
should choose models based on their accuracy in measuring risk. 
Instead, evidence suggests that individuals often choose models to 
justify predetermined business strategies.225 This risk becomes 
particularly acute in securitization when firms use a practice known as 
“mark-to-model” to value underlying assets instead of using market 
prices.226 This subversion of the risk-management process stems from 
                                                     
223. Nocera, supra note 163, at 46. 
224. Regulators have increasingly paid attention to agency-cost theories of explaining rating 
agency failures during the subprime crisis and have focused, in particular, on potential conflicts of 
interest created by rating agencies receiving payment from the issuers, whose securities the agencies 
are rating. See, e.g., July 2008 SEC Rating Agency Report, supra note 89, at 23–28, 31–32. 
225. Neil Shah, Can Wall Street be Trusted to Value Risky CDOs?, REUTERS, July 13, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN0929430320070713, permanent copy available 
at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n225.pdf. 
226. One real-estate holding company executive commented on the potentials for abuse with this 
practice: 
When you use a computer model, you’re going to see people make bad decisions . . . Sellers 
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the pressure on individuals to justify riskier business strategies with 
higher returns (which, in turn, may increase an individual’s 
compensation). 
This bias in selecting models might offer a partial explanation for 
why the Basel II internal-model approach in the SEC’s CSE Program led 
to investment banks dramatically increasing leverage227 and having 
insufficient capital to weather a crisis.228 If an internal model suggested a 
higher level of regulatory capital than a standard capital regulation (i.e., 
a regulation that does not allow a bank to use its internal models, but 
instead applies categorical risk weights to bank assets), it is questionable 
whether a financial institution would place itself at a competitive 
disadvantage and follow the model. 
ii. Implementation Errors 
Even if financial institutions select appropriate models in the abstract, 
the individuals who write the computer code behind the risk model can 
make errors. These bugs or implementation errors can propagate 
themselves when models are copied, and can lead to serious mistakes in 
computing risk. In 2008, press reports indicated that Moody’s blamed a 
“bug” in some of its computer software for incorrect ratings of several 
CDOs.229 
iii. Inputs to Code: Low-Documentation Loans 
Once models have been designed and selected, they require human 
beings to input information. At this input stage, individuals can subvert 
the workings of the model by entering incorrect information. Without 
accurate information, even well-designed models cannot adequately 
gauge risk. Low-documentation loans—or mortgage loans that were lent 
without lenders insisting on documentation of the borrower’s income or 
                                                     
were incentivized to say the assets were worth a lot, because they made a commission on sales. 
Many fund managers charge fees in part based on the value of their assets, so they also had 
incentives to say this stuff was worth a lot. It’s not impossible to choose models that support 
the need for a high-value product.  
Tully, supra note 150. 
227. See Labaton, supra note 122 (describing increases in investment-bank leverage in wake of 
CSE program). 
228. Cf. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 122, at xi (recommending that SEC reassess 
capital requirements in CSE Program in light of Bear Stearns collapse). 
229. Sam Jones et al., Moody’s Error Gave Top Ratings to Debt Products, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 
2008. 
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employment230—enabled borrowers (or unscrupulous brokers) to supply 
incorrect information (or no information at all) about income, 
employment, and other information relevant to establishing a borrower’s 
creditworthiness. By one estimate, more than fifty percent of subprime 
loans issued over a two-year period ending in 2007 were made on the 
basis of such limited documentation.231 These loans greatly increased the 
credit risk of mortgages and, by extension, related mortgage-backed 
securities. Consequently, these mortgages defaulted at much higher rates 
than predicted by rating agency and securitization-pricing models and 
caused the subprime crisis to mushroom.232 
The problem of low-documentation loans was enabled by the fact that 
originators did not insist on documentation, mainly because they 
transferred the credit risk via securitization. This underscores the need to 
focus not only on the technical aspects of code, but also on the 
incentives of actors in designing, inputting data, and using code. 
iv. Gaming the Models 
As noted above, individuals at financial institutions can also game 
models by making risky investments designed specifically to avoid 
detection by the models.233 
v. Interface between Codes Revisited: Information Destruction & 
Information Externalities 
The problem of low-documentation loans points to a larger problem: 
different institutions in the securitization and hedging chain may have 
insufficient incentive to share information they have on the credit risks 
and other risks with institutions down the chain. Moreover, these 
institutions have little incentive to share operations of their risk models 
with one another.234 
This lack of information sharing is suboptimal, as explained by the 
following discussion of the economic externalities involved with risk 
modeling. Like risk management in general, the use of effective risk 
                                                     
230. Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 
1046 (2007). 
231. Alan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It Happen and How Will It 
End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13 (2007) (discussing data for “past two years”). 
232. E. Scott Reckard, Adjustable Loans Spur New Worries, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at A1. 
233. Nocera, supra note 163, at 46. 
234. See Buiter, supra note 134. 
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modeling creates positive externalities. A firm that mitigates its own risk 
reduces credit risk for its creditors.235 Similarly, systemic risk can be 
reduced effectively only if institutions throughout the financial system 
make adequate risk-management decisions. Otherwise, the system is 
susceptible to domino effects as one institutional failure could cause 
cascading failures of other firms due to counterparty and reputation 
risk.236 Furthermore, providing information about a firm’s risk models 
has positive externalities because it allows counterparties and the market 
as a whole to better evaluate credit risks posed by the firm.237 
Yet firms have disincentives to provide full disclosure about their risk 
modeling (aside from the fact that they cannot fully capture the benefits 
of an externality). Detailed information on a firm’s risk modeling would 
allow other firms both to adopt copycat models (and thus free ride on the 
investment made in constructing the model), and to profit by trading 
against the firm by reverse-engineering the firm’s trading strategies. 
On the other hand, incomplete information on a counterparty’s risk 
models reduces the ability of a firm to gather information needed to 
assess its own credit risk. Moreover, incomplete information may create 
a lemons problem;238 if investors or counterparties cannot distinguish 
firms with good risk models from those with poor ones, even firms with 
solid models may be assumed to pose excessive credit and systemic risks 
and may find it difficult to escape the contagion of latter day bank 
runs.239 Competent regulators can provide some certification as to the 
                                                     
235. The positive externality becomes clearer when considered in reverse; the financial failure of 
a firm imposes negative externalities. See GARRY J. SCHINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 48–50 (2006). 
236. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 39 (positing that because of positive externalities, individual firms 
have insufficient incentives to mitigate systemic risk). 
237. See SCHINASI, supra note 235, at 49 (discussing information as positive externality). 
238. The “lemons problem” describes how markets can unravel when there are a number of 
products of varying quality in a marketplace, but consumers cannot distinguish the high-quality 
products that are more costly to produce (for example, good cars or financial institutions with good 
risk-management practices) from inferior products produced at lower cost (for example, “lemon” 
cars or firms with bad risk-management policies). When this situation occurs, consumers will 
discount the price they are willing to pay for a product and will pay the price for what they perceive 
to be an average-quality good. This average price will mean sellers of high-quality products will not 
receive the full value for their products. Many will decide to exit the market (or perhaps produce 
shoddier, lower-cost products). This will drive the average quality of the product in the marketplace 
down. This drop in average quality will lead consumers to further discount price, leading above 
average producers to exit. This creates a vicious cycle. For the seminal work on the lemons 
problem, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
239. Cf. Guillermo Calvo, Author’s Remarks, WANTED: WORLD FINANCIAL STABILITY 57 
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quality of risk modeling, but the failure of regulators to inspect risk 
models in any depth devalues this certification. 
vi. The Risk of Homogeneity Among Risk Models: An Anti-
Coordination Problem 
Even if regulators competently evaluate individual risk models, the 
interaction of the risk models of different firms creates anti-coordination 
problems.240 Too much homogeneity among risk-management strategies 
of financial institutions can increase systemic risk.241 If firms have the 
same strategies and similar portfolios, market shocks can cause the firms 
to sell the same types of assets at the same time to cover their 
positions.242 A widespread sell-off would cause values of these assets to 
plummet and trigger a sell-off of yet another class of assets.243 
Homogeneity of risk management and models can thus lead to spiraling 
market declines.244 There has been some concern that this is already 
occurring in the subprime crisis; prices of certain less risky assets have 
plummeted, as financial firms sell off “good assets” to cover their losses 
on the “bad.”245 This homogeneity in risk modeling mirrors the risks 
posed by homogeneity in completely different kinds of systems; for 
example, homogeneous computer systems are more prone to viruses and 
security breaches.246 
                                                     
(Eduardo Fernandez-Arias & Ricardo Hausmann eds., 2000) (characterizing cross-border financial 
contagion, in which financial crises spurred by one sovereign’s default spread to other nations, as a 
lemon problem). 
240. An anti-coordination game is a game in which players adopting the same strategies create 
losses for all the players. For a more technical definition, see Fuhito Kojima & Satoru Takahashi, 
Anti-coordination Games and Dynamic Stability, 9 INT’L GAME THEORY REV. 667, 668–69 (2007). 
241. Carol Alexander, The Present and Future of Risk Management, 3 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 3 
(2005) (positing that regulation may perversely create this homogeneity). 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. The risk posed by homogeneity points to a need for financial institutions and regulators 
to focus on a second kind of portfolio diversification; each institution needs to analyze not only 
whether its own portfolio is sufficiently diversified among asset classes, but also whether its 
portfolio is sufficiently differentiated from the portfolios of other firms in the market. 
245. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Missed Opportunities, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2007, available at 
2007 WLNR 15269893. 
246. See Rainer Bohme, Cyber-Insurance Revisited (2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www1.inf.tu-dresden.de/~rb21/publications/Boehme2005_CyberInsurance_Revisited_ 
WEIS.pdf, permanent copy available at  http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev127n246a.pdf; Rainer Bohme & Gaurav Kataria, Models and Measures for Correlation 
in Cyber-Insurance (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www1.inf.tu-dresden.de/~rb21/ 
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Homogeneity of risk models and risk-management practices has 
several causes. First, the education of quantitative-finance experts in 
business schools and economics department can lead to orthodoxies in 
risk modeling.247 Second, there is a wide literature on herd behavior and 
mimicry in financial markets.248 If herd behavior leads firms to invest in 
the same types of assets and firms adjust risk modeling to justify their 
investment decisions, risk models will tend to converge. Less cynically, 
if firms find a risk model that gives them a competitive advantage, firms 
that do not seek to imitate that model may be at a competitive 
disadvantage. Moreover, widespread reliance on rating agency ratings 
can create this homogeneity.249 
Even disciplined firms that are worried about homogeneity in risk 
modeling will struggle to ensure that their models are sufficiently 
different from those of other firms. Without information on the modeling 
practices of other firms, the anti-coordination problem posed by 
homogenous modeling is difficult to solve. 
vii. A Coordination Problem Among National Regulators 
In contrast to anti-coordination problems, regulators in different 
countries face a coordination problem with risk modeling. Under Basel 
II, banking regulators in each nation have substantial discretion over the 
extent to which capital requirements may be set according to either 
internal financial institution models or rating agency ratings. This 
flexibility permits national bank regulators to refrain (or forbear) from 
stringently examining and regulating the models used by home-country 
banks and rating agencies. These banks and rating agencies may press 
their regulators for lenient treatment in order to take on more risk and 
make more profit. Yet it is in the collective interest of national regulators 
to coordinate the level of their regulation—including their level of 
                                                     
publications/BK2006_Correlation_CyberInsurance_WEIS.pdf, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n246b.pdf. 
247. Cf. Nocera, supra note 163; Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed 
Wall Street, WIRED, Feb. 23, 2009, at 74. 
248. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 135–68 (2000). 
249. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement No. 257: Reliance on Third-Party 
Credit Ratings 1 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www.aei.org/research/shadow/projectID. 
15/default.asp, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
84washlrev127n249.pdf (asserting that widespread use of credit rating models by financial 
institutions is problematic because the “use of common models is a key source of systemic risk as 
they are likely to err in the same direction). 
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enforcement—to ameliorate systemic risk.250 
III. SELECT POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
Part II examined several factors that contributed to the failure of the 
new financial code and, consequently, exacerbated the subprime crisis. 
This final part considers several implications of that analysis for policy 
and legal scholarship. 
Five general points frame the discussion of implications and 
reverberate throughout Part III. First, law must not defer to the new 
financial code uncritically. Regulators cannot outsource oversight—
whether over consumer lending or over risks posed to financial 
institutions and global capital markets—to risk models and other codes 
without thoroughly and continuously auditing those codes.  Second, this 
auditing requires both technical expertise and a constant critical 
examination of technical assumptions. Regulators cannot abdicate 
responsibility to examine codes because they are embedded in a complex 
technology or involve elegant economic models. Third, the best codes 
are worthless when paired with bad incentives. Codes are designed and 
used by human agents, which creates agency costs. Codes can only lead 
to effective risk management with incentive structures that address these 
agency costs. Fourth, the complexity of code highlights the value of 
simplicity in the design of both financial instruments and regulation. As 
engineers have come to realize, sometimes simple designs are the best 
solutions to complex risks.251 Finally, promoting transparency or 
“openness” in the new financial code promotes efficiency and as well as 
other normative interests. 
A. Scrapping Basel II’s Internal Models Approach 
All five of these general points argue in favor of scrapping those 
provisions in the Basel II Accord that allow banks to set any capital 
requirements according to their internal models252 (which this Article 
collectively refers to as the “Internal Models Approach”).253 The 
                                                     
250. This coordination problem was the very reason for the first Basel Accord. See supra note 13. 
251. Henry Petroski has popularized the benefits of simplicity in response to engineering 
problems. See, e.g., HENRY PETROSKI, INVENTION BY DESIGN: HOW ENGINEERS GET FROM 
THOUGHT TO THING (1996). 
252. See supra Part I.B.iii.3. 
253. This term thus captures the Internal-Ratings Based Approach for credit risk (supra note 
115), the Internal Models Approach for market risk (supra note 116) and the Advanced 
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spectacular failure of the proprietary risk models of financial institutions 
to predict or adequately protect against the current crisis makes 
entrusting the proprietary risk models of banks with the responsibility of 
setting regulatory capital seem dangerously misguided. In particular, the 
dismal record of the Internal Models Approach in the SEC’s CSE 
Program254 provides a warning to U.S. bank regulators to reverse and 
shelve recent regulations that implement Basel II’s Internal Rating-
Based Approach.255 Moreover, international bank regulators responsible 
for the Basel II Accord should revisit the Accord and excise the Internal 
Models Approach provisions and return to the methods of Basel I for 
setting regulatory capital. 
Basel II should be reversed quickly before it is fully implemented. 
The SEC’s application of the Internal Models Approach led to a 
disastrous reduction in capital by investment banks.256 Now, because of 
the ongoing financial crisis, many of those U.S. investment banks have 
been bought by or converted into commercial banks.257 According to 
economic studies, Basel II will also lead to undercapitalization when 
applied to commercial banks.258 
Although bank regulators could revise the Internal Models Approach 
to provide more guidance to national bank regulators on auditing the 
internal models of banks (as the staff at the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has already done),259 the fundamental flaws of the Internal 
Models Approach cannot be overcome. More detailed audit standards 
would increase the compliance costs to the regulated banks. At the same 
time, specific rules run the risk of becoming quickly obsolete due to the 
constant change and increasing complexity of both private industry 
modeling and financial products.260 Highly specific rules on model 
standards would also need to be constantly rewritten to address attempts 
                                                     
Measurement Approach for operational risk (supra note 117). 
254. See supra notes 126–127, 164 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra note 15, at 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288. 
256. Supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. 
257. Steven Sloan, Can Even Fed Oversight Alter Investment Banking Giants?, AMER. BANKER, 
Feb. 2, 2009. 
258. Supra note 120. 
259. See, e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II 
MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (Jan. 2009). 
260. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement No. 238: Basel II: One-and-a-Half 
Cheers for the Standardized Approach 3 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/research/ 
shadow/projectID.15/default.asp, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
wlr/notes/84washlrev127n260.pdf. 
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by financial institutions to game the rules. 
More detailed rules would also increase the workload of regulators, 
and financial regulators lack the capacity and incentives to enforce even 
existing rules. Reviewing the numerous risk models of any one financial 
institution, let alone back-testing and stress-testing a sample of those 
models, would require enormous regulator manpower. Regulators 
responsible for reviewing multiple firms but who are strapped for 
resources have an incentive to be less rigorous in examining any one 
firm. Auditing complex models also requires that regulators maintain 
sufficient technical expertise. Yet regulators face a perpetual 
disadvantage as the private sector continues to generate technical 
innovations in financial instruments and modeling. 
Even armed with sufficient resources, national bank regulators often 
lack incentives to audit risk models vigorously. As noted in Part II.B.vii, 
bank regulators worry whether their foreign counterparts are forbearing 
from taking regulatory action so as to give their home-country banks a 
competitive advantage in the international marketplace. Again, this 
problem was one of the impetuses for the first Basel Accord. 
The Basel II Accord makes policing the actions or inaction of 
regulators even more difficult because of its complexity and lack of 
transparency. Basel II contains the worst of both rules and standards. It 
gives national regulators a wide measure of discretion in deciding which 
banks may use internal models and whether those models satisfy the 
Accord’s standards.261 Primary regulatory responsibility can be 
outsourced to opaque, proprietary models of financial institutions. It is 
then difficult to assess how thoroughly regulators are auditing these 
models.262 
Although imperfect, the simpler rules of Basel I have numerous 
comparative advantages. They are easier to understand, facilitating 
compliance by banks and auditing by regulators. They are also much 
more transparent; it is easier not only for regulators to audit a bank, but 
also for competitors of that bank and regulators in other countries to 
check whether the bank was cheating (and whether its regulator was 
adequately performing its job).263 Furthermore, simpler rules mean that 
counterparties of banks can more easily understand and model the credit 
risks posed by banks. 
                                                     
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
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B. Promoting Open Source Risk Models 
Assuming that Basel II is not repealed, a second-best policy 
alternative would be to require that banks seeking to use internal risk 
models for setting their capital requirements publicly disclose the details 
of those risk models. 
i. The Outlines of an Open-Source Approach 
The disclosure approach to fixing Basel II draws on some of the 
concepts and arguments that support the open source movement in 
software.264 Open source software can have different meanings, but a 
core element of the concept is that the source code265 of the software is 
openly disclosed.266 
This Article’s proposal builds on this disclosure element of open 
source. (Another key element to the definition of open source is that 
open-source software must be licensed to the public; the license must 
allow other individuals to use and copy the source code freely and to 
modify the source code for their own use or for creating derivative 
software.267 These aspects of open source software are less essential to 
this paper’s proposal.) Here is how disclosure could work with respect to 
Basel II. Institutions would not be obligated to disclose the internal 
working of their models; disclosure would be merely a condition of use 
of these risk models for purposes of setting regulatory capital. In 
                                                     
264. Lawrence Lessig has argued that the transparency of open-source software allows the public 
to understand and counteract the ways in which internet code allows the private sector and the 
government to regulate social use of the internet. As noted in the Introduction to this Article, there 
are parallels between how internet architecture functions as a regulatory code (per Lessig) and how 
private risk models now function as a new form of financial regulation. See supra notes 22–25 and 
accompanying text. 
Lessig’s open proposal for checking the regulatory power of internet code has a parallel in this 
paper’s proposal for checking the new financial code. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
265. Source code of software is the text, written in a programming language that is readable to 
humans and that converts human instructions into computer executions. Apple Public Source 
License Version 2.0 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at http://www.opensource.apple.com/apsl/, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n265.pdf. 
266. See Open Source Initiative, Open Source Definition (July 7, 2006), http://opensource.org/ 
docs/osd, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev 
127n266a.pdf. The Open Source Initiative is a non-profit organization that promotes open source 
concepts in software, acts as “steward” of the Open Source Definition, and certifies whether 
software licenses comply with the standards in the Open Source Definition. Open Source Initiative, 
About the Open Source Initiative (Sept. 19, 2006), http://opensource.org/about, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev127n266b.pdf. 
267. See id. 
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exchange for this right, institutions would be required to disclose the 
assumptions, structures, and algorithms used in their models. 
To back-test models thoroughly (for the reasons described below), 
outsiders would also need information about the historic investment 
portfolio of the financial institution. In addition, gauging the 
effectiveness of risk models going forward would require some 
information about the institution’s current portfolio, but quite a bit of 
information on the portfolios of large publicly traded financial 
institutions is already publicly available online through securities 
filings.268 
ii. The Benefits of Open Source 
Using a disclosure-based, open-source inspired approach to fix Basel 
II would have multiple benefits. First, public disclosure would promote a 
transparency in risk modeling that would enable the private sector to 
audit a financial institution’s risk modeling. With greater transparency, 
counterparties could evaluate the adequacy of a financial institution’s 
risk management to assess their own counterparty/credit risk. Opening 
the source code of risk models would thus mitigate information gaps 
between the models of different financial institutions, as the 
counterparties of any bank would better understand the bank’s basis for 
its risk management.269 
Public disclosure would also allow an institution’s competitors to 
double-check the work of regulators. Competitors could police whether 
an institution is “cheating” and adopting weak models to justify taking 
on additional levels of risk for competitive advantage.270 Policing by a 
                                                     
268. More nuanced and more frequent disclosure (perhaps even close to real-time disclosure) of 
portfolio information might be facilitated by a recent U.S. securities-disclosure initiative. The 
XBRL program requires that certain securities issuers present financial data in XBRL format (a 
special standard for business-related computer files that allows for easy sharing of files among 
different software applications). This format would facilitate easier uploading of financial 
disclosures straight from the information systems of a securities issuer to the web and easier 
downloading of that disclosure by web users straight into analytical software programs. Final Rule: 
XBRL Voluntary Financial Reporting on the EDGAR System, Securities Act Release No. 33-8,529, 
Exchange Act Release, 34–51,129, 70 Fed. Reg. 6,556 (Feb. 3, 2005). 
Commentators have already lauded the potential of the XBRL Rule to increase transparency in 
financial markets and allow an “army of citizen regulators” to police risk in financial markets. 
Daniel Roth, Road Map for Financial Recovery: Radical Transparency Now!, WIRED, Feb. 23, 
2009, at 81. 
269. See supra Parts II.A.v and II.B.v. 
270. See supra Part II.B.vii. 
AUTHOR_FINAL_EDITS_GERDING_5-22-09B.DOC 6/7/2009  6:51 PM 
Code, Crash, and Open Source 
191 
bank’s or regulator’s competitors would mitigate the problem of 
regulatory forbearance. Unlike regulators, both counterparties and 
competitors would have a strong natural incentive to audit a financial 
institution’s risk models thoroughly. Unlike regulators, private auditors 
would also have sufficient technical expertise. 
Another benefit to open-source financial code is that greater 
disclosure would likely generate more robust financial models—i.e., 
models with fewer faulty assumptions or otherwise with a lower degree 
of model risk error. Scholarship in computer science provides evidence 
that open-source software code is less prone to bugs because open code 
allows many minds to tackle debugging.271 
The transparency of open source would help individual financial 
institutions solve the anti-coordination problems posed by homogenous 
risk models.272 Even non-banks (which are not subject to Basel II) 
worried about homogeneity could adjust their own risk models after 
reviewing open source models. 
iii. Potential Drawbacks: Would Open Source Promote Homogeneity? 
Opening the source code of financial models faces some potential 
drawbacks. First, financial institutions would fear surrendering increased 
profits from proprietary risk models (or even enabling others armed with 
knowledge of the institution’s risk models to trade against them).273 But 
this drawback is addressed by the elegance of making opening source 
code optional. Banks are free to develop their proprietary models. But if 
they want to use those models to set regulatory capital under Basel II, 
they must disclose. This might create a powerful disincentive to take 
advantage of Basel II and use proprietary models to set capital 
requirements, but this disincentive may be justified given the serious 
flaws outlined in Part III.A of Basel II’s reliance on internal models. 
There is a second drawback to the open-source approach; full 
disclosure of risk models would allow competitors to copy a bank’s risk 
models and imitate their risk-management strategies. This could lead to 
greater homogeneity in risk-modeling and risk management practices, 
                                                     
271. James W. Paulson et al., An Empirical Study of Open-Source and Closed-Source Software 
Products, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 246, 252–54 (2004) (finding 
empirical support for fewer design defects in open-source software than closed-source). 
272. See supra Part II.B.vi. 
273. Another possible, related concern is that dampening the profit motivation to develop risk 
models might also dampen valuable innovation in risk management. 
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which, as Part II.B.vi explains, could increase systemic risk.274 This 
concern is quite valid, but, on the other hand, there is already a large risk 
of homogeneity in proprietary risk modeling.275 In fact, the risk of 
homogeneity is heightened under the proprietary approach. Because 
proprietary models are not publicly disclosed, it is difficult to understand 
the scope of the current risk. This lack of transparency prevents financial 
institutions from assessing the risk of whether their internal risk 
modeling and management are too similar to those of other institutions, 
raising the anti-coordination problem discussed in Part II.B.vii. 
Regulators may have access to information about the modeling of 
different financial institutions, but lack the resources to measure the 
degree of homogeneity between models adequately. By contrast, greater 
disclosure of models would allow individual financial institutions, as 
well as scholars and private watchdogs, to assess thoroughly the risk of 
homogeneity and raise alarms of increased systemic risk. 
iv. Extending the Open-Source Approach 
Indeed, to understand the value and risk (including systemic risk) of 
complex assets, such as asset-backed securities, the marketplace would 
need greater information about the risk models used by earlier 
institutions in the chain of securitization. Otherwise, flaws in any model 
in any link of the long securitization chain (in which mortgages are used 
to create mortgage-backed securities, which are then used to back CDOs, 
which then are used to create “CDOs-squared” which are then hedged 
with credit default swaps) snowball into greater model errors later in the 
chain.276 
Therefore, there is great value in extending the open-source approach 
all the way back to the data-mining software used to price and structure 
original consumer mortgages. But encouraging open source of this 
broader array of risk models would need a different policy lever than the 
approach outlined above, i.e., using Basel II and the ability to “set your 
own” capital requirements as a carrot to promote disclosure of models. 
In short, some degree of regulation would be necessary to require 
disclosure of the inner workings of those models that are used to price 
                                                     
274. There may be some precedent for open source leading to homogeneity. J.P. Morgan first 
developed value-at-risk models and then allowed other firms to copy the models, which became an 
industry standard. Nocera, supra note 163, at 33. 
275. Supra Part II.B.vi. 
276. Supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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asset-backed securities or derivatives. 
This extension of the open source approach would have all of the 
potential efficiency gains outlined above: allowing counterparties and 
the financial markets to assess the quality of particular firms’ risk 
models, addressing information gaps between models in the chain of 
securitization and hedging, promoting better, more robust models by 
allowing many minds to tackle “debugging,” and allowing firms to 
evaluate the risk of excessive homogeneity in modeling. 
v. Open Source and Rating Agencies 
One set of private-industry models, those of rating agencies, would 
particularly benefit from the open-source approach. Many commentators 
have noted the dismal track record of rating agencies, particularly with 
respect to asset-backed securities; there has been a shocking level of 
default among classes of asset-backed securities with high ratings.277 A 
full discussion of the potential reasons behind the poor performance of 
rating agencies is beyond the scope of this Article. But it is clear that 
either rating agencies are using flawed models to assess the risk of asset-
backed securities or they are failing to follow these models when issuing 
ratings. 
In February 2009, the SEC proposed regulations to require that rating 
agencies disclose certain performance data including statistics tracking 
the default rates on securities rated by the rating agency.278 This 
regulation does not go far enough. The SEC should require that 
registered rating agencies, NRSROs, fully disclose the “source code” of 
every model (including algorithms and assumptions) used to rate 
securities. This would allow regulators and investors to assess and 
troubleshoot flaws in the models used by the rating agencies. The 
voluntary disclosure made by rating agencies to date, including Standard 
& Poor’s releasing a CDO Calculator,279 does not provide sufficient 
data. 
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Disclosure would not place the NRSROs at a grave competitive 
disadvantage because of the oligopoly position they enjoy. Again, they 
enjoy this oligopoly position not only because of the SEC license they 
hold, but also because myriad financial regulations (including Basel II) 
place restrictions on financial institutions holding securities other than 
“investment grade”; these restrictions create a demand for investment-
grade securities and for ratings from NRSROs.280 
vi. Open Source and Consumer Protection 
The open-source model should extend all the way back to the data-
mining and credit-scoring software that lenders use to design and market 
consumer financial products. The Federal Reserve Board recently 
proposed amendments to Regulation Z (which implements Truth in 
Lending Act provisions) to improve disclosures to consumers of credit 
card terms.281 Regulation Z and similar regulations could be used to 
mandate public disclosure by lenders of their data-mining and credit-
scoring software and risk models. 
Opening the source code of these risk models would allow purchasers 
of asset-backed securities that are ultimately backed by consumer 
financial products to gauge the quality of the risk modeling that prices 
the risk of these products. But opening this source code would have 
several benefits to consumers as well. First, transparency in data-mining 
and credit-scoring software would allow consumers to see how financial 
products transfer risks from financial institutions to consumers. For 
example, consumers could evaluate risk models used to price adjustable-
rate mortgages to determine the extent to which the lender is passing on 
market risk of interest-rate increases back to borrowers. Similarly, 
consumers could benefit from access to models used by credit card 
companies determining which customers should receive complex 
penalty provisions in their credit card contracts.282 Greater consumer 
information would allow consumers to detect when lenders are taking 
advantage of information asymmetries or consumer behavioral biases to 
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extract greater value from consumers.283 
Of course, consumers might not be able to make much use of 
disclosure of data-mining and credit-scoring software by themselves. 
But, as Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein recently noted in 
applauding the Federal Reserve’s proposed rules, third parties could 
audit these disclosures for consumers, alerting them to excessively risky 
provisions.284 Moreover, consumer watchdog groups could inspect data-
mining and credit-scoring software for other concerns, including 
whether individual privacy is being infringed upon (which is a concern 
of Professor Lessig with respect to internet code),285 and whether lenders 
are engaging in subtle racial or other discriminatory lending practices. 
C. In Praise of Equity 
The failures of the new financial code outlined in this Article urge 
rethinking the growth of asset-backed securities and derivatives at the 
expense of markets for equity securities. The failures of the risk models 
used to price asset-backed securities and derivatives indicate that equity 
securities may enjoy some comparative advantage in providing a 
cushion against risk. 
A recent article by Professors Gilson and Whitehead mapped out the 
decline of equity markets due to the increasing popularity of complex 
financial instruments.286 The article noted that these instruments, 
including securitizations and credit derivatives, enable companies to 
reduce their cost of capital by disaggregating the residual risk 
traditionally borne by shareholders; companies can then offload these 
risks to more efficient risk bearers.287 Derivatives, securitization, and 
insurance policies separate out specific risks faced by companies, and 
allow these firms to contract with third parties to assume the distilled 
risk. Professors Gilson and Whitehead have persuasively argued that 
growth of asset-backed securities and derivatives have sapped equity 
markets, as companies now have cheaper options to pass on residual 
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risk.288 
In pricing these instruments, companies rely on the same types of 
codes that failed in the subprime crisis. The failures of these codes—
whether stemming from model risk, information gaps, agency costs, or 
something else—call into question just how efficiently these novel 
financial products distill, allocate, and spread risk. In particular, many 
models for pricing asset-backed securities were unable to process the 
cocktail of different forms of risk; as noted in Part II.A.iv above, 
spillover and feedback effects between different forms of risk frustrate 
risk modeling. Equity holders who bear undivided residual risk have 
many comparative advantages as risk bearers; they bear residual risk, no 
matter whether the source is credit, market or liquidity risk or some 
cocktail of the three. 
Equity has other advantages for issuers. First, derivatives, options, 
and debt instruments allow counterparties to transfer or terminate their 
bearing of risk through the use of assignment provisions, margin calls 
and redemption provisions. By contrast, equity has the virtue of being 
what banking scholars call “patient capital.”289 Capital raised through 
equity is locked into a company for a longer time, increasing its capacity 
to absorb risk. 
Second, unlike credit derivatives, asset-backed securities and 
insurance policies, equity securities do not require companies to assess 
the credit risk of their counterparties. By contrast, the disconnect and 
distance between the financial instrument and the underlying cash-
producing assets in derivatives and other complex financial instruments 
complicates the assessment of credit risk; recall the long chain from 
mortgages to mortgage-backed securities to CDOs to credit default 
swaps.290 Lastly, the complex structure of derivatives and the complex 
financial modeling used to price them resist easy understanding. As with 
consumer mortgages and banking rules, complexity in financial devices 
may thus exacerbate systemic risk. 
These points do not contradict the descriptive claim made by 
Professors Gilson and Whitehead that companies have taken advantage 
of the completion of capital markets to shift risk using non-equity 
instruments. Perhaps the problems with asset-backed securities in the 
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subprime crisis will stem this shift in liquidity away from equity 
markets,291 but that may be a temporary phenomenon. Yet the flaws in 
modeling complex financial instruments may prove longer lasting. The 
brief sketch of the comparative advantages of equity securities argues for 
further study of the circumstances when shareholders may prove to be 
the most efficient bearers of residual risk after all. If equity’s advantages 
are significant but equity markets are underused due to market 
imperfections, scholars and policy makers should consider policies to 
channel issuers and investors back to equity markets. 
CONCLUSION 
Sophisticated risk models produced by advances in quantitative 
finance had great promise in allowing financial institutions to measure 
and manage risk. These models enabled the growth of complex financial 
instruments—from mortgage-backed securities, to CDOs, to credit 
default swaps—that allowed financial risk to be transferred and spread to 
those parties in the economy who theoretically could bear that risk most 
efficiently. These products lowered the cost of borrowing for consumers 
and the cost of capital for financial institutions. 
Dazzled by the promise of these risk models, financial regulators 
delegated to them broad authority for regulating risk in the economy. 
Regulators entrusted private-sector risk models with the duty to manage 
risk born not only by consumers and financial institutions, but the risk to 
the entire economy. Private-sector risk models thus became a “new 
financial code” that displaced traditional legal codes for regulating 
financial risk. 
The severity of the current financial crisis underscored that faith in 
the new financial code had been misplaced. Consumer borrowers, 
financial institutions, and financial institutions’ creditors and investors 
have all paid a terrible price for the failure of this code, as have 
taxpayers, investors at large, workers, and those future generations who 
face an increased national debt. 
This Article unpacked the flaws in the new financial code, including 
flaws in its internal design and flaws in the incentives of the firms and 
individuals who used the code. These two types of flaws point to a 
critical need to reexamine and roll back the outsourcing of financial 
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regulation to the new financial code—for example, by jettisoning the 
Internal Models Approach of Basel II. These two types of flaws also 
point to a need for greater transparency in the new financial code; this 
Article proposed harnessing the power of the open-source movement in 
software to improve both financial-institution risk models and the 
incentives of those who use them. 
These two types of flaws also argue for greater engagement by 
lawyers and legal scholars with the machinery of risk modeling for three 
reasons. First, as with internet code, lawyers and legal scholars must also 
engage technical aspects of the new financial code, because these 
technical details can shift massive amounts of risk or even magnify risk. 
Second, the new financial code has come to serve as de facto regulation 
of a vast swath of consumer finance, banking, and capital markets. 
Third, lawyers and legal scholars can play an invaluable role in 
designing the incentives of the individuals and firms that use risk 
models. They must play that role; lawyers and legal scholars bring a 
needed perspective on how seemingly mechanical rules, when applied 
and interpreted by human agents, can be manipulated in ways 
unanticipated by those with an engineering mindset. 
